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THE INTEREST OF AMERICA IN INTERNATIONAL CONDITIONS

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THE INTEREST OF AMERICA IN INTERNATIONAL CONDITIONS

BY

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I

THE ORIGIN AND CHARACTER OF PRESENT INTERNATIONAL GROUPINGS IN EUROPE

THE INTEREST OF AMERICA

IN

INTERNATIONAL CONDITIONS

I

THE ORIGIN AND CHARACTER OF PRESENT INTERNATIONAL GROUPINGS IN EUROPE

IN all countries, the tendency of the general population is to concentrate attention upon those questions which are commonly called domestic. The individual man's immediate neighborhood, the state, territory, or province, where he lives, the particular needs of the region in which his interests lie, have with him a prominence upon which it is needless to insist, and which is both natural and proper. The familiar phrase, "local self-government," represented to American thought by the rights of the States and by the tradition of the town meeting, conveys to our minds, and

there maintains, the necessary recognition that those immediately upon the spot, and conversant with conditions by actual daily contact, are best fitted to control and administer the affairs of the local community. The State governments, the various municipalities, the subdivisions into towns and villages, are outward visible signs of this conviction; which with most of us, however, reflects a simple tradition, not our own reasoned apprehension and knowledge.

A due recognition of this general truth, which intrusts the immediate locality with the functions of local administration, lies at the foundation of successful working institutions. But at a very early period of our national history, before independence was achieved, in measure even before it had been declared, — that is, during the colonial period, — it was seen that much more than local self-government was needed, if the

results at which such government aimed were to be attained effectually. The habit of mind bred by acquaintance with such a system only, which did not look outward, upon other communities, except with a jealous prepossession notoriously common in the inter-relations of the thirteen colonies, militated distinctly, not only against the advantage of all, the common advantage, but also against the advantage of each. The necessity was seen of formal inter-colonial relations, corresponding in character to inter-national relations, although pregnant of a still closer tie.

The epithet " provincial," by its associations more applicable to Europe than to America, nevertheless, by its implication of narrowness, befits the prejudices and conduct which notoriously characterized our early history, colonial, state, and sectional, up to the War of Secession. The harm of provincialism, of provincial habits

of thought and act, is not that they reflect the conditions of the province, or section; for in so far they are beneficial. It is that they exclude a proportioned sense of the relations of other communities to one's own. In this, a metropolis may be as hopelessly provincial as the remotest corner of the country, and with less excuse. Wall Street is perhaps provincial, despite its numerous outlying interests.

The same line of thought applies to the inter-relations of the greater community, that of nations. The first concern of each member of this is doubtless its own internal affairs, the ordering of its own house. There is nothing that the individual, whether man, or community, or nation, can contribute to the general welfare of greater value than the soundness of his or its own principles and life. But a realization of this truth which stops short there, neglecting to consider and to appreciate the conditions and

necessary tendencies of other men, or of other members of the international community, is provincial in the worst sense.

An apt illustration of the usual indifference of our American public to international conditions, except for brief moments when some circumstance out of the usual course threatens to involve ourselves, or traverses some of our accepted notions, is to be found in the stationary condition of the organization of the Department of State between the close of the War of Secession and the end of the War with Spain. The impetus given to international relations by the later war, alike in its immediate antecedents and in its consequences, is obvious even to a casual consideration; but the requirement for development has been little appreciated, outside of the Government circles directly involved in the additional labor entailed, or by the very few and for the most part silent persons who interest themselves

in such matters. The public attitude still holds good which a shrewd old member of Congress is said to have expressed in his advice to one newly elected: to avoid service upon a fancy committee like that of Foreign Affairs, if he wished to retain his hold upon his constituents, because they cared nothing about international questions.

It is curious to remember that this attitude of international indifference was less marked among Americans in the colonial period, when the several colonies were in the strictest sense provinces, than it afterwards became; perhaps even less than it now is, with all our advantages of steam and telegraph, of daily information from the four quarters of the globe. The reason. of course, is not far to seek, either of the earlier interest, or of the later indifference. The American of the ante-revolutionary period was directly connected with

Europe, economically as well as politically, to a greater degree, relatively to that period of development, than he is now. He was affected not only by the relations of his community to European states, but also, and very closely, by the relations of those states to one another; precisely as the whole European family of to-day undergoes a tremor when a shock occurs in any one of its more unstable commonwealths. Rumors of European wars disquieted the American colonist; the outbreak of war involved him as a participant. To use a graphic expression of Macaulay's, concerning the great Frederick's seizure of Silesia, — "The evils produced were felt in lands where the name of Prussia was unknown. In order that he might rob a neighbor whom he had promised to defend, black men fought on the coast of Coromandel, and red men scalped each other by the Great Lakes of North America."

Rare and scanty as communications then were, they were characterized by the deliberateness and fullness of the letter writer, not pressed to catch a mail; while the reader had time more closely to discern and appreciate the determining conditions of affairs, because his attention was less distracted by a daily succession of numerous insignificant items. The contrast between such comprehension and the foreign-news columns of most American newspapers of to-day is that between a telegram and the domestic correspondence of near relations. Few things are more significant, or suggestive, than the space and character of the information concerning foreign complications to be found in American dailies, and that given by their British contemporaries. This reflects the difference of interest in readers; between those who, like our colonial forefathers, felt themselves directly interested, and those who, like most among

ourselves, believe the United States only remotely concerned in events, unless they touch us immediately.

There was much to originate the existing attitude of mind, and there is still much to perpetuate it; though it may be believed that it has now become an anachronism. Speedily after our War of Independence came the French Revolution and the wars ensuing from it. The new nation found itself at once in a network of successive embarrassments, arising from engagements with France contracted in the past. Upon this followed a variety of vexatious incidents resulting from the maritime war between that country and Great Britain. Hence sprang Washington's fervent warning against entangling alliances, and a most earnest desire on the part of his successors in the Presidency to keep free from involvement in European quarrels. Events seconded this wish. The extension

of our territory from the Atlantic to the Pacific, and to the Gulf of Mexico, by the acquisition of Louisiana and the Floridas, in 1803 and 1821, gave to our boundaries precision of definition by natural features, thus avoiding contentions inherent in artificial demarcation; while the revolt of Spanish America eliminated European localized contact with the new republic, except on the side of Canada.

Coincident with these realized conditions came the Monroe Doctrine, in the early twenties of the last century. The leading purpose of this was to exclude European intrusion from this hemisphere, and thus to accomplish the wish to avoid entanglements, whether of alliance or dispute. Experience of centuries had demonstrated that disturbance in America was sure to arise from European conflicts, and to be colored by them, when European possession existed. To prevent the extension of

such a cause, by new acquisitions or by exchanges between European Powers, was the essential spirit of the Doctrine; and although the maintenance of it has been fruitful of contentions, it doubtless has contributed markedly to the end in view. It also fixed and intensified the repulsion to association with European policies, hardening into a prepossession still operative, and which perhaps has become unreasoning, and obstructive, as prejudice always is; preventing a clear vision of the tendencies shown by the present evident unrest in the state of the world. Conservatism is a fundamental and admirable ingredient in national policy; but like the Constitution, the great exponent and guardian of the conservative forces, there must be found in national ideals a certain elasticity, and capacity for progress. No degree of conservatism will prevent changes external to one's self; and if the man or

nation cannot find adaptation to the times, even that which seems to be held most firmly may be lost.

The origin of American aloofness from questions of European policy, as well in interest as in act, is thus to be found in incidents of our early history, already briefly noticed. It is needless to comment, beyond mere mention, upon the fact that this indifference was fostered and perpetuated by the internal sectional difficulties consequent upon the disputes about slavery. From the promulgation of the Monroe Doctrine to the end of the War of Secession the nation was occupied almost exclusively in endeavoring to keep its house in order, and to settle national self-government upon solid foundations. This entire period, of over a generation, was spent in attempting the problem of maintaining unity — the essence of national vigor — by reconciling the irreconcilable.

In any country, particularly in one as extensive as ours, divergence of interests between sections must give rise to oppositions which may be called sectional; but in our experience no such divergence has been virulent and menacing, as was that which confronted with each other two systems of labor, radically hostile in spirit as in form, and modifying, not only industrial and economical conditions, but the mental and moral characteristics of the communities affected. To our present subject this situation is of interest chiefly as contributing to explain the persistent alienation of national thought from international relations. The nation did not possess the conditions of external effectiveness. Internally sick, only partially developed, immature, it had not the strength; while, preoccupied with the symptoms of its malady, it had no attention to spare for remote external events.

Yet, inasmuch as this portion of our national progress is in essential characteristics only a repetition of other history, though differing in the particular causes, it is well that the stage thus differentiated by its peculiar features from that which preceded and from that which followed — from the present in which we are now living — be viewed in its analogies to other historical periods. States are made up of human beings; and hence there is in their experience a certain inevitableness of tendency which needs to be observed, if only to avoid, or to modify in action. Slavery has not been the only cause that has divided nations sectionally. Sectional division has arisen from differences of religion, and from differences of race. In Germany the line of division was between north and south; the south Roman Catholic, the north Protestant. The issue was a political disintegration of the entire ter-

ritory which has been remedied only in our own day, — subsequent to the War of Secession. In France the general line of demarcation was again East and West; the strength of Protestantism was in the south. In these two nations, the religious feature was not the sole cause of internal dissensions; but it alone was distinctly sectional, and in virtue of this local concentration it was the most powerful, the most persistent, the longest to survive.

The instructive feature for us to note is that while this internal dissension lasted the international relation of the nations concerned was that of being acted upon by other people; in short, defensive. Spain, unified in spirit by the perpetual religious wars with the Moors, and consolidated in territory by their expulsion, and by the marriage of Castile with Aragon, was then the united nation which found itself able to impress its policy upon foreign com-

munities. Were its aims good or bad, it was in a position to enforce them; to carry on vigorous external action wherever its particular interests, or its more general views, disposed it to interfere. For over a century, therefore, Spain was the dominant power in Europe; because united, while Germany and France were rent asunder by internal divisions, and Great Britain was still politically a divided island, England against Scotland. In general outline, whatever the particular manifestation from time to time, all these stood on the defensive, internationally, against Spain, for over a century

France was the first to extricate herself from her internal difficulties. The nations of western Europe were in one respect happier than ourselves, to whom slavery has bequeathed a still unsolved racial question, mainly sectional in its distribution, but intensified by fundamental distinctions.

While not without sectional characteristics, they possessed elements of homogeneousness which lent themselves to national consolidation. To recall the events which led to the concentration of national power in France is not in point here. The fact alone concerns us, that, under the successive administrations of Henry IV, Richelieu, Mazarin, and Louis XIV, consolidation and concentration were effected; while during the process, and consequent upon its completion, there developed and was sustained a powerful external policy which, like that of Spain, whose it supplanted, made itself felt, as by a necessary law of being, in all the international relations of the day. To France there belonged the attribute, which we now see so often named in current writing, called the hegemony of Europe; one accompaniment of which was the subversion of the preponderance previously exerted by the Empire of Spain.

The propriety of the policy and measures which under these circumstances marked the conduct of France is less to our modern purpose, as observers of contemporary events, than is the reaction provoked. An overweening power, which by its varied influence trammeled and affected the internal and international relations of all other states, incited a general alliance among the nations of Europe to withstand the progress of a predominance which already threatened and, if unchecked, might accomplish the dependence of the whole of Europe upon a single state. This was the manifestation of a tendency analogous to that by which Nature herself restores conditions after a disturbance; a movement towards an equilibrium among the members of the European family, then the entire world of civilization, as we understand that term. It was a spontaneous effort of self-preservation, among numerous scat-

tered communities, directed against a single concentrated highly organized oppressor; and, despite the inherent feebleness of alliances and coalitions, it effected its purpose. Louis XIV was dragged down from the height of his power. A century later, under Napoleon, a similar preponderance was attained by France; but the gigantic fabric erected by him was overthrown also by the same process of combined resistance.

To the imagination of statesmen, these beneficent achievements consecrated the means by which they had been effected, viz.: a concert of action among states, framed to resist such oppression as had been recently experienced on the part successively of Spain and of France. Upon observers of international politics had been produced an impression, closely analogous to that made upon the people of England, at about the same time, by the burden of Cromwell's rule by means of a standing

army. The concentration of military force within Great Britain, as an instrument of government, dominating all interests and all other elements of popular self-expression, reflected on a smaller scale the condition of international relations when the physical force of a single state, by its concentration of energy, predominated over the disseminated and often conflicting wills of the remainder of the group. The means of counteraction, beginning in alliances, was formulated into the familiar expression, "Balance of Power," the opposite of preponderance; a conception which, while it anteceded the birth of the phrase itself, continued for three centuries to influence decisively the actions of statesmen. The distinguished English historian, Bishop Stubbs, has written: "The Balance of Power, however defined, that is, whatever the Powers between which it is necessary to maintain an equilibrium, such that the

weaker should not be crushed by the stronger, is the principle which gives unity to the plot of modern European history. It is the foremost idea of the three centuries, 1500–1800. Whatever the drama, this is the key to the plot." In the course of time the conception received an elaboration which it was thought would assure its effectiveness as a preserver of the *status quo*, of equilibrium and of peace. This process of formulation resembled the elaboration which of late years has been dealing with International Arbitration as a means to an end; indeed to the same end, of peace, by coöperation on an established basis of international equity.

Artificial arrangements such as these are effective only in so far as they take account of, and correspond to, the contemporary qualities of human nature; to its virtues, defects, passions, interests. The remark applies equally to Balance of Power

and to schemes of Arbitration. Underlying them all is a raw material, which cannot be worked into a finished product possessing characteristics not found in the material itself. In the great settlement following the downfall of Napoleon, it was thought that by territorial distributions there could be constituted an effective equilibrium, or balance, among the five great Powers; while the integrity of the lesser states, as then determined, would be secured by a basis of guarantees. Attempts to violate such conditions would be the business of everybody, as had been consciously the case during the previous century concerning the stipulations of Utrecht in 1713; the last universal settlement prior to that of 1815. Ascendencies, such as the world had seen, were to be stopped in their beginnings; not allowed, as with Philip II of Spain, Louis XIV, and Napoleon, to grow into a colossus, overshadowing the

continent. Thus the Balance of Power endorsed international Intervention upon recognized occasion.

The scheme practically assumed that equilibrium of power and assurance of quiet, if realized, gave also equality of conditions and opportunity; otherwise, however adroit the momentary adjustment, how could contentment be permanent? and without contentment how expect men to be quiet? The assumption is much like one which should maintain that, give all men an equal degree of physical strength, they start fair on the race of life. We know from experience that equalities much more extensive in scope result speedily in inequalities, due to individual capacities, mental, moral, or artificial; and that from these inequalities spring social and economical dissatisfaction and dissension. The *status quo* of Europe in 1815 was not merely one of a balance of regularized power, arti-

ficially constituted. There were among the different states, upon the equilibrium of which the scheme depended, varying stages of political, social, and industrial development; varying conceptions of right; varying degrees of wealth and opportunity. These speedily, and progressively, as time advanced, would give rise to national dissatisfactions, whence in due order follow national ambitions and disputes. The subsequent history of Europe to to-day is the record of these strivings; of their workings and results, based upon and conforming to the raw material of human nature swayed by interest and sentiment.

With the overthrow of Louis XIV the predominance in Europe had passed to Great Britain. This was almost unnoted at the time, but increasingly demonstrated by the events of the eighteenth century, and clearly recognizable in 1815. The new condition, however, was essentially differ-

ent from that of its predecessors; and was so understood, though perhaps not formally analyzed by contemporaries. The power of Great Britain was not that of predominance, strictly so called. She never had the military strength, as for a time Philip II, Louis XIV, and Napoleon had, to make her successfully aggressive against a continent determined on resistance. Her predominance was that of a determinative factor, resembling a third party in politics; of a make-weight, which casts the balance from one side to the other. Her ability to do this lay in the defensive strength of her insular position, which had enabled her to concentrate attention upon industrial enterprises and commerce; secured from the disturbances of war, which are most grievous when the national territory is open to invasion. This immunity began with the union of England and Scotland under one crown, in 1603; consummated by the full

political union, with a single parliament, in 1707, six years before the Treaty of Utrecht. Again an internal union, of provinces politically separate but racially homogeneous, was the precursor of national expansion and self-assertion.

The expansion and aggression of England, again, differed from those of her predecessors; in this, that she turned not towards Europe, but towards the world outside. This may be considered truly as the beginning of that which we now know as "world politics." In this England led the way; not that she had not predecessors, and competitors, but in that she alone, in addition to an insatiate thirst for colonies, saw in them not so much possessions as extensions of England herself. The British colony in this resembled the Roman Colonia; it was politically as well as industrially an expansion of the mother state. This did not save Great Britain from a selfish policy

towards her colonies; but because they, as formally constituted, were considered the abode of Englishmen, entitled to all the traditional and constitutional privileges of English citizens, there existed from the first an underlying spirit of appreciation, which, after the severe lesson of the War of American Independence, — during which the English rights of the colonists were admitted by a very large minority of the English at home, — has resulted in the formal and cordial relations that are now the common aim, professed by all the English-speaking communities of the British Empire.

It therefore is not the individual part played by Great Britain in the struggle against Napoleon which concerns us here. Decisive as that was, it was founded upon the advantages before named, insular and industrial, which had enabled her, and induced her, to the acquisition of her colo-

nial markets, and upon them and her own defensive security had developed the commercial and industrial resources which financed the alliances against the Emperor. That struggle over, the industrial and commercial preëminence remained, as did the colonies. These constituted the start over all the other Powers, possessed by Great Britain in the European race then beginning, which characterized the whole of the wonderful century but recently ended. Disfigured though this was in its course by not infrequent wars, and marked by great political changes, its distinguishing feature has been that of industrial development, seconded by the coincident advances of science. The start which Great Britain had, not only in material wealth, but in national expertness based upon uninterrupted industrial and commercial habits, enabled her easily to take the lead and long to keep it unchallenged.

This was not the only great disparity under which the European states labored in 1815. The exhaustion from wars almost incessant for twenty years had grievously affected the populations of the continental countries, as well as their industries. The victims of war are chiefly men in the prime of life, the potential fathers of a new generation. Great Britain had fought, and many of her citizens had fallen; but her armies were relatively small, and naval control, her special military function, called for few great battles. France came out of her Revolutionary struggles, of which the wars of Napoleon are an integral part, not only with immense losses, but with the incubus of voluntary non-increase of population which has qualified her position in the world. She was embarrassed also, and has remained embarrassed, by a dissemination of national power into an extensive administrative system, an army of functionaries;

the maintenance of which not only is unduly burdensome, but by the cumbersomeness of its constitution defeats its own end of efficient government. Unlike the Germany of to-day, the preponderant element of French influence is not in the government, but in the thrift of the individual Frenchman.

Germany remained an assembly of states, mostly petty, mutually independent, as before the Revolution. The existence of two great powers, Austria and Prussia, recognized as German, rather emphasized than mitigated the absence of union in the German race. Their mutual opposition, traditional and otherwise, constituted an impediment to political unity until the one or the other could be definitely subordinated. The coincidence, that at this very moment, three months before Waterloo, Bismarck was born,[1] though trivial, is

[1] April 1, 1815.

impressive. While the rivalry of Austria and Prussia lasted, Germany by inherited prepossessions divided into two groups; each finding its center of attraction in one or other of the two great monarchies. The primacy by ancient custom and remaining prestige rested with Austria, the older state. The political constitution of both was that of absolute monarchy, intensified momentarily by the reaction from French revolutionary excesses. Of Russia, the fifth great Power, there is less need to speak. The uncontrolled sway of the Czar, tempered by assassination but unchallenged by popular sentiment, gave an appearance of strength which was by no means wholly misleading. The strength was there; but in it, as in its German contemporaries, despotism was a political weakness, owing to the unavoidable administrative interposition of an irresponsible bureaucracy between the ruler and the ruled. The last

decade has witnessed the result, but not yet the end, of conditions which have handicapped Russia, and for an indefinite future paralyze her great inherent strength through defective organization and imperfect national institutions. The tendency has been to throw her out of the European race, back upon Asia, to which her political organization associates her.

In the situation thus sketched, as constituted in 1815, the leading features, bearing upon our own contemporary conditions, were the material prosperity and world system of Great Britain, and the disunion of the German race, which kept Germany in political and industrial backwardness; making her, to quote the late Chancellor of the Empire, Prince Bülow, simply a geographical expression, and denying her as a whole the name of a great Power. This condition had been fostered deliberately by France, from the days of Richelieu

to those of Napoleon; and was by him continued, though modified. In these two facts lay the germs from which have sprung the decisive present characteristics of European international relations, wherein are continuously to be traced an effort towards equilibrium. It would be perhaps more accurate to define this effort as the coincident struggle towards preponderance on the part of opposite groupings of the principal states, the result of which is to constitute an unstable and shifting balance. How unstable and how shifting this equipoise will be realized by those who have considered attentively the series of events following the revolution in Turkey in the summer of 1908; not in themselves alone, but in the intricate network of national necessities, ambitions, and jealousies, which the occasion brought prominently into view.

In Germany, thus for a long time distanced in the race of material prosperity,

and handicapped by traditions of disunion extending over centuries, is now to be found the beginnings and potentiality of an overshadowing concentrated power; similar in that respect, however different in origin and in characteristics, to those successively known to modern history in Spain, France, and Great Britain. It differs from the two former, when in the height of their power, in that their determining ambitions were confined to Europe, which then constituted for itself the total of European politics; all outside enterprise then resting for its basis upon European conditions. It differs again from that of Great Britain in that her power rested wholly upon the sea, and she at no time wielded an irresistible army, such as the combination of Austria and Germany now presents.

There is found now in Germany great preponderance of power, not only military but in organization of every kind, coinci-

dent with a well ascertained purpose of playing a part in world politics, the precise character and direction of which can as yet be only surmised, even by the Germans themselves, as it must depend upon circumstances not yet mature, nor to be certainly foreseen. After writing these words, I find in a recent instructive article,[1] "Why does Germany build war-ships?" by Professor Delbrück, professor of history in the University of Berlin, the following just remarks: "The great conquests of the world's history have seldom been inspired by mere ambition. The empires of the world have not been built up from the mere desire of power. Events have generally evolved themselves so that a conflict has arisen out of comparatively insignificant causes, such as a border line and a commercial right of way; and the conqueror by his very victory has been obliged to

[1] *The Contemporary Review*, October, 1909.

enlarge the boundary of his country. Even the Romans were not intentionally the conquerors of the world." In Germany's European progress, the struggle with Austria, in 1866, seems to have been foreseen and deliberately contrived; whereas with France, although foreseen in a general way, the precipitation of hostilities at the particular moment appears to have been simply a sagacious, if somewhat unscrupulous, seizing of opportunity, for doing which the previous preparation of a watchful intellect gave the readiness needed to take the tide upon its turn.

The prototype of modern Germany is to be found rather in the Roman Empire, to which in a certain sense the present German Empire may be said to be — if not heir — at least historically affiliated. The Holy Roman Empire merged into that somewhat extenuated figment attached to the Austrian Habsburgs, which finally deceased at the

opening of the nineteenth century; but the idea itself survived, and was influential in determining the form and name which the existing powerful Germanic unity has assumed. To this unity the national German character contributes an element not unlike that of antiquity, in the subordination of the individual to the state. As a matter of national characteristic, this differs radically from the more modern conception of the freedom and rights of the individual, exemplified chiefly in England and the United States. It is possible to accept the latter as the superior ideal, as a higher stage of advance, as ultimately more fruitful of political progress, yet at the same time to recognize the great immediate advantage of the massed action which subordinates the interests of the individual, sinks the unit in the whole, in order to promote the interests of the community. It may be noted incidentally, without further

insistence just here, that the Japanese Empire, which in a different field from the German is manifesting the same restless need for self-assertion and expansion, comes to its present with the same inheritance from its past, of the submergence of the individual in the mass. It was equally the characteristic of Sparta among the city states of ancient Greece, and gave to her among them the preponderance she for a time possessed. As an exhibition of social development, it is generally anterior and inferior to that in which the rights of the individual are more fully recognized; but as an element of mere force, whether in economics or in international policies, it is superior.

The two contrasted conceptions, the claims of the individual and the claims of the state, are familiar to all students of history. The two undoubtedly must coexist everywhere, and have to be reconciled; but the

nature of the adjustment, in the clear predominance of the one or the other, constitutes a difference which in effect upon the particular community is fundamental. In international relations, between states representing the opposing ideas, it reproduces the contrast between the simple discipline of an army and the complicated disseminated activities of the people, industrial, agricultural, and commercial. It repeats the struggle of the many minor mercantile firms against a single great combination. In either field, whatever the ultimate issue, — and in the end the many will prevail, — the immediate result is that preponderant concentrated force has its way for a period which may thus be one of great and needless distress; and it not only has its way, but it takes its way, because, whatever progress the world has made, the stage has not been reached when men or states willingly subordinate their

own interests to even a reasonable regard for that of others. It is not necessary to indulge in pessimistic apprehension, or to deny that there is a real progress of the moral forces lumped under the name of "public opinion." This unquestionably tells for much more than it once did; but still the old predatory instinct, that he should take who has the power, survives, in industry and commerce, as well as in war, and moral force is not sufficient to determine issues unless supported by physical. Governments are corporations, and corporations have not souls. Governments moreover are trustees, not principals; and as such must put first the lawful interests of their wards, their own people.

It matters little what may be the particular intentions now cherished by the German government. The fact upon which the contemporary world needs to fasten its attention is that it is confronted by the

simple existence of a power such as is that of the German Empire; reinforced necessarily by that of Austria-Hungary, because, whatever her internal troubles and external ambitions, Austria is bound to Germany by nearness, by inferior power, and by interests, partly common to the two states, as surely as the moon is bound to the earth and with it constitutes a single group in the planetary system. Over against this stands for the moment a number of states, Russia, Italy, France, Great Britain. The recent action of Russia has demonstrated her international weakness, the internal causes of which are evident even to the most careless observer. Italy still belongs to the Triple Alliance, of which Germany and Austria are the other members; but the inclination of Italy towards England, springing from past sympathies, and as a state necessarily naval, because partly insular, partly peninsular, is known, as is also her recent draw-

ing towards France as compared with former estrangement. Also, in the Balkan regions and in the Adriatic Sea there is more than divergence between the interest of Italy and the ambitions of Austria, — supported by Germany, — as shown in the late annexations and their antecedents. An Austrian journal, which foreshadowed the annexations with singular acumen, has written recently,[1] "We most urgently need a fleet so strong that it can rule the Northern Adriatic basin," — in which lies the Italian Venice, as well as the Austrian Trieste, — "support the operations of our land army, protect our chief commercial ports against hostile maritime undertakings, and prevent us from being throttled at the Strait of Otranto. To do this, the fleet must at least attain the approximate strength of our probable enemy. If we lag behind in developing our naval

[1] The *Mail*, April 20, 1910.

programme, Italy will so outrun us that we can never overtake her. Here more than elsewhere to stand still is to recede; but to recede would be to renounce the historical mission of Austria." The Austrian *Dreadnoughts* are proceeding, and the above throws an interesting side light upon the equipoise of the Triple Alliance. In the Algeciras Conference, concerning the affairs of Morocco, Italy did not sustain Germany; Austria only did so.

Analyzing thus the present international relations of Europe, we find on the one side the recently constituted Triple *Entente*, France, Great Britain, and Russia; on the other the Triple Alliance, Austria-Hungary, Germany, and Italy, of thirty years' standing. The sympathies of Italy, as distinguished from the pressure of conditions upon her, and from her formal association, are doubtful; and the essentials of the situation seem to be summed up

in the Triple *Entente* opposed by the two mid-Europe military monarchies. In a comparison of force, except naval force, everything favors the latter. They stand locally shoulder to shoulder; bound, if by nothing else, by that facility for needed mutual support which their contact gives. This support, however, cannot be defensive only; no purely defensive attitude can be successfully maintained. There must be preparation at least for offense, the power to compel respect by ability to strike as well as to shield, an ability markedly shown in the enforcement of the Balkan annexations of 1908; while in the economical conditions of the two states, in the relations of population to the means of existence, is to be seen the evidence that such striking, whatever the immediate nature or scene of the blow, must be directed towards at least a reasonable control of access to the markets necessary to their industries

over the world at large. The Austrian movement towards the Balkans and the Ægean is of this character. More and more, for over thirty years past, Germany has been changing from an agricultural to an industrial community. More and more for this reason she needs the assured importation of raw materials and, where possible, control of regions productive of such materials. More and more she requires assured markets, and security as to the importation of food, because less and less comparatively is produced within her borders for her rapidly increasing population. This all means security at sea.

Under this combination of necessities, and with this accession of power consequent upon national unity and national organization of strength, Germany at the opening of her course has found the markets and the productive districts of the world outside her own borders substantially pre-

empted by possession or control, alien to herself. Upon the splendid achievement of national unity, she has constituted for herself a huge industrial system, and has built a great merchant fleet now in incessant active employment, carrying the products of her industry, and maintaining the processes of intercourse. She has ships, and she has commerce; but for the third link in the chain of exchange, for markets, outside the inadequate body of consumers constituted by her own population, she has to depend upon the strenuous competition of trade, in countries almost wholly foreign to her control, made more arduous by the arbitrary provisions of other governments at a period when Protection is increasingly the note of the internal economy of states. The only valuable market which she can effectually command is that within her own borders; the few colonies she has been able to lay hold of, at the late period

of her entry into the race for territory, offer no adequate prospect of relief in this respect.

Thus handicapped at the outset, Germany has found impediment to her career concentrated in a rival so near at hand as to be constantly in sight; thus by propinquity keeping alive the sense of obstruction. Ill feeling need not arise from such a circumstance. Unfortunately, however, it does more often than not; and it may very well be that the national characteristics which have found expression in very different governmental conceptions as to the relations between the state and the individual, tend to promote misunderstanding and dislike. In the article before quoted, Professor Delbrück says: "The system of English government is popular in other countries, whereas the German *régime* is not favored. In Germany we hold a strong independent [executive] government,

assisted by a democratic Parliament, to be a better scheme than the continual change of party rule that is customary in England. We believe that the flourishing condition of Germany to-day, with her conscription, her educational system, and her social laws, which have practically succeeded in abolishing distress, are due to this form of government, which combines strict order with liberty. But the other nations prefer the English system, which is less severe and affords greater freedom. A greater extension of English rule and influence would therefore be more favorably regarded than an increase of German power." An official of long experience on board German steamers has commented to me upon the gentleness of manner in the average American or Englishman, as contrasted with Germans, in addressing attendants; a difference not remotely traceable to the peremptoriness inherent in immediate con-

trol of personal action by governmental interference, military in cast. Be this as it may, bitter rivalry does exist; and the generally conceded superiority of German methods in industry and commerce, the careful studious adaptation of means to ends, attention at once minute and comprehensive to the details of business, untiring energy, and intelligent governmental support, have had to encounter and to overcome original advantages of position on the part of Great Britain.

These advantages were — and in measure still are — those proverbially inherent in possession; actual occupancy of the industrial and commercial field, of the world's carrying trade and productive districts, the prestige thus deriving, and yet more unfair — in the estimation of a sufferer — the political tenure of huge tracts of territory, available for settlement and exploitation, only partially occupied, and yet, because

owned politically, closed to utilization by Germany as a nation. Germans can go to them indeed, and welcome. They make good citizens, the more so that, while loving the motherland still, they love better the more liberal conditions of American and British life, or, for the matter of that, any scheme of society less intrusively ordered than that they left; but they are lost to Germany. However advantageous to their own prosperity the change may be, there is in it nothing to reconcile the home country, or those who remain there, to the want of a greater Germany; wherein might be established and fostered those reciprocal relations, based on mutual dependence, which are open to Great Britain and her colonies, and by them actually are being realized and valued in increasing measure. Nothing could be more congenial to the German temperament than the elaboration of such a system; whether it would

work as well as British laxity — be overdone — is another matter. The want of the opportunity, in the apparent natural developments of the future, cannot but rankle with a state whose appetite for colonies stands sufficiently revealed.

Besides these initial economical and political disparities, the situation of the British Islands is a military factor of profound significance to Germany. The only shore line of the Empire is that of the North Sea and the Baltic. All the river ways of Germany, so extensively developed and utilized, interconnected by canals already existing or planned, constituting a huge internal system of water communications, find their outlet in one or other of those two seas, through which all sea borne trade enters or departs. The whole external commerce of Germany, going or coming, focusses there. The North Sea coast-line, if to be covered by hostile cruisers, is little over sixty miles

long, from the Ems to the Elbe. The Baltic seaboard is much more extensive; but all access to it from the Atlantic is through the Skager-Rack, the external approach to which is less than a hundred miles wide. It is true that merchant steamers may protect themselves in some measure by skirting the Norwegian and Danish coasts within neutral limits, when once attained; but a large margin of risk will still remain, for directly across all lines of communication thence to the Atlantic, and so to every ocean, lie the British Islands. Most of us carry in our mind's eye the width of the English Channel and of the Straits of Dover, along the full length of which, moreover, is English land containing two principal naval stations; but the other way round, by the north of Scotland, the North Sea itself is nowhere four hundred miles wide, and in places only three hundred. In case of war between the

two countries, no German ship, as international law now stands, can use this stretch of water without liability to capture; while a successful blockade of the German harbors on the two seas puts a stop to all commerce, as well by neutrals as by Germans. Such a blockade by Great Britain of the North Sea, including the two chief commercial cities, Hamburg and Bremen, would rest on ports not four hundred miles distant. A Baltic blockade would be a much more serious undertaking.

We see here the military explanation of the Kiel Canal, connecting the Baltic with the North Sea at the mouth of the Elbe. Ships of war and commerce can thus pass from one sea to the other, without exposure. This permits naval concentration against an enemy venturing to divide his fleet between the two. Also, while it does not help the case of German merchant ships in the North Sea, it does permit neutrals,

if debarred from Hamburg and Bremen by blockade, to go to Baltic ports, if not blockaded, whence their cargoes can be conveyed by the canal system to many destinations, by continuous water ways, obviating in great part the necessity of rehandling *en route* — of transshipment. This is a great defensive provision; for, conceding a hostile navy not fully twice the force of the German, it cannot undertake to blockade both seas. If it does, one fraction or the other is inferior to the German whole, upon the coming out of which, assured by the canal, it must retire; and by accepted international law such retirement destroys the blockade for the time being. Until it is reconstituted, in such force as to hold its ground, no capture of a neutral can be made; and, moreover, an additional margin of time is required, for neutrals to receive a notification of the changed conditions which make a voyage

unlawful. It is to be noted, however, that the substantial advantage arising from securing the ports of the one sea or the other for neutral vessels, by lessening the facility for blockade, is much qualified by the fact that so large a percentage of the mercantile tonnage of the world to-day is either British or German. In case of war between the two countries, the remaining vessels, constituting the neutral tonnage, would be quite inadequate to the necessary transportation to German ports, over and above its previous employment in other trades.

It may be noted also, as a qualifying factor, that the great German naval base on the North Sea, Wilhelmshaven, the continuous development of which, parallel with the building of the fleet itself, is so characteristic an illustration of the systematic prevision and preparation which constitutes much of the greatness and menace of Ger-

many, is separated from the Elbe by some twenty miles of dangerous coast with off-lying shoals. In some degree this modifies, though it by no means destroys, the advantage of the Kiel Canal as an assured intermediate link between the two seas. Over this strip of coast, strategically important to a watching fleet, stands guard the island of Heligoland, now a heavily fortified base for torpedo vessels, which in 1890 was ceded to Germany by Great Britain in exchange for the relinquishment of Germany's claim to the island of Zanzibar, off East Africa. Being thirty miles from the coast, Heligoland projects by so much more the torpedo defence requisite to such conditions.

Defensive provision, such as that of the Kiel Canal, is essential and admirable, but the security obtained falls far short of that demanded by national pride as well as national interest. Americans who recall what Cuba once meant to our international

policy may appreciate what the British Islands by situation mean to German commerce. The whole Gulf Coast trade, including that of the Mississippi valley, had — and has — to pass within a hundred miles of Cuba, on one side or the other; a circumstance which made it intolerable to the United States that the island should go into the hands of any powerful naval state. The change of political tenure and the developed power of the Union have put that anxiety into the background. Cuba's position remains; but the probability of its being otherwise of use as a base for naval operations has disappeared, at least for the time. The position and political tenure of the British Islands are permanent, as things go in this world; their naval strength is now supreme; and it is the pronounced intention of both the principal political parties so to maintain it.

The reason for this pronouncement is

sound and imperative. Equally with Germany in kind, and to a much greater degree, Great Britain depends upon external sources for raw materials, for food, and for access to markets. Her population, only two thirds that of Germany, is in so far inferior as a source of military power; while, being also larger in proportion to the territory, it is less able to live off the land. The population to the square mile is over four hundred; that of Germany only three hundred. Moreover, the dependence of Great Britain upon the sea is absolute; she has not, like Germany, any continental frontiers by which to receive supplies. The river Rhine by itself, emptying through a friendly Holland, is a copious highroad to the interior of Germany which in no way can be closed by Great Britain. On another frontier is Russia, one of the granaries of the world. In 1909 Russia produced more wheat than any other country in the world, 213,425,-

336 quintals. The United States came second, but at a large margin, 193,544,975 quintals.[1]

As regards the causes for maintaining a navy, the greater necessity of self-preservation lies upon Great Britain. For reasons absolutely vital she cannot afford to surrender supremacy at sea. Moreover, the relations between herself and her colonies impose the obligation of defense for them; not indeed by local superiorities in their several waters, an object at once unattainable and needless, but by a concentrated superiority of naval force in Europe, which as yet remains the base, at once of defense and of attack, as far as other quarters of the world are concerned. Yet, at the same time, this supremacy of Great Britain in European seas means a perpetual latent control of German commerce, owing to the position of the British Islands. This has

[1] *The Mail*, February 21, 1910. A quintal (metric system) contains 220 ½ lbs.

been emphasized in the last few years by a concentration in home waters of the British navy, previously more or less dispersed; a very large fraction having been in the Mediterranean, the comparative abandonment of which has an imperial significance.

There can be little doubt that this concentration has been caused by the double consideration of the growth of the German navy and the recognized supremacy of the German army. The possibility of a sudden invasion, during an enticed absence of the British fleet, was for years the dream of Napoleon, and the terror of his British contemporaries. He was foiled, and by no narrow margin. Nevertheless, even before the days of steam, the conception was not wholly fantastic; it had been entertained before Napoleon, by Choiseul in the time of Louis XV. At present, the physical difficulties are greatly reduced by steam, which makes the necessary ferriage

of troops wholly independent of wind and weather, and extremely rapid. This does not indeed entirely remove the obstacles and delays inherent in assembling the vessels and embarking the troops, an operation embracing a multiplicity of nice details, scarcely to be effected without timely observation; but the mobilizations against Austria and France are remembered, as well as the astute policy which preceded and precipitated them. There has been a real fear, among men whose opinions demand consideration, that by surprise a body of troops might be landed sufficient to overpower organized opposition; an army in face of a mob.

Hence the concentration of the British navy; and correlative to it a German naval programme, involving not merely the numbers of ships, but the evolution of a complete factory and docking system, for the rapid preparation and maintenance

of naval material of all kinds, in large quantities. This scheme, as revealed in its entirety, is an interesting illustration of the peculiar German capacity for quiet and masterly elaboration. The object is not officially stated, but a particular utterance may be believed not far from the truth: that it is to provide a navy of such force that the largest in the world will hesitate to incur hostilities. "German policy," writes Delbrück, "can never aim at the subjection of England; but it should and must endeavor to restrict her movements." This may mean no more than to check the control over German trade inherent in British position; but as the programme calls for a navy larger than that which Great Britain now has, she is compelled to a ship-building competition, to maintain her lead.

It is clear, therefore, that the British navy stands opposed in the balance to the

German army; for could control of the sea be wrested, Great Britain neither has nor contemplates an army able to resist that of her rival. Germany, on the contrary, does contemplate such a navy in addition to her army. Though vastly the richer state, Great Britain cannot obtain from her people that which Germany can from the very different antecedents of hers. Individual liberty, possibly intensifying natural characteristics, has made it impossible to organize the community in Great Britain as it is in Germany. Such an aptitude is the work of generations, and a generation of time is not to be expected here. The successes of Great Britain, as a maritime and colonizing community, have been the work of individuals, singly or in free co-operation; the state remaining in the background, and, as it were, only seeing fair play. Initiation has been private; in Germany essentially corporate.

The result is illustrated in the recent British old age pension scheme. Although with that of Germany in view, as a model to imitate or to modify, this attempt at corporate — state — action, betrays the state's lack of experience and of firmness of grasp. Neither the individual employer nor the individual employed is called upon, as such, to bear part of the burden which properly concerns both. The community bears the burden, undoubtedly, as in Germany; but in Great Britain it is borne, not by a careful interadjustment among the members, but by a simple dumping of the whole, in a concentrated load, to be met by a taxation which directly discourages both enterprise and thrift; the one by overcharging its results, the other by placing a premium on its absence. Not by such crude parody of state action can Great Britain meet the calculated progress of Germany.

All this enforces still more the serious character of German preponderance. Upon the Continent no single state can make head against her in aggregate of power; while coöperation between any two, or all, of them encounters the difficulty of combining their action, and the certainty that from the nature of things, in any grouping of the Powers, Austria-Hungary will stand by the side of Germany. Thus the British navy is left the sole military force in the world superior to anything that Germany can as yet bring into action; while with this military circumstance combines an industrial and commercial rivalry, increasing yearly in intensity, and affecting the welfare of the two peoples, as expressed in the needs and incomes of the populations. The various diplomatic visits which the press brings recurrently to our knowledge are the reflection of this condition of things. In them Germany sees an attempt to iso-

late and restrict her action; the other states an understanding by which to check the supposed excess and intrusiveness of her ambitions. Whichever view be adopted, the salient organized factors are in Great Britain and in Germany; in the wealth, the commercial and industrial systems of the two, in the British navy and in the German army. The other states make important contributions on either hand to this balance; but as contributory, not as principal.

II

THE PRESENT PREDOMINANCE OF GERMANY IN EUROPE — ITS FOUNDATIONS AND TENDENCIES

II

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RECOGNITION of the protagonism of Germany and Great Britain and of the causes upon which it depends, does not ignore the existence of other circumstances, — such as the Austrian annexations of the past year, or the Morocco contention of 1905, — which in their permanence, or in their transient appearance, have from time to time affected, or still do affect, the course of nations. The fact remains that such minor occurrences are rather of the nature of occasions, which elicit action corresponding to their importance, as estimated by the several governments, but controlled ultimately by their

bearing upon relations, of which the central factor is the contemporary condition and antagonism of Germany and Great Britain, springing from the historical antecedents stated. "It is my opinion," writes Delbrück, "that the rivalry between the two great nations — England and Germany — is the natural outcome of the state of affairs, and can never be abolished. This rivalry, however, does not involve the necessity of war; it suffices that by means of strenuous armaments both Powers should maintain an equal balance of power, and keep each other within bounds." To this balance the other European states contribute, on the one side or the other.

Delbrück's line of reasoning applies to every other nation, as well as to Great Britain; and to every other cause of contention, as well as to those which constitute the rivalry between her and Germany. The scene of a war depends largely upon

the geographical situations of the parties to it; but its origin may be remote in place, and especially now, when, as he argues, and we all know, the nations of European type, including the United States, are compelled more and more to seek both raw materials and outlets for their industries and their capital in the less highly developed parts of the world, and are there in mutual competition. That is, in Asia, Africa, and South America. At the end of May, 1909, the British Secretary for Foreign Affairs, speaking in the House of Commons, said that there remained then no European question likely to give rise to acute differences between the states of Europe; but he added that the Congo question, an African question, if not rationally handled, might cause European difficulties with which those of the last few months — that is, the Austrian annexations, definitely recognized by all the Powers only in April,

1909, — would be child's play. "The definitive aim, which Germany sets herself, is not to acquire vast colonies, but to *enforce* such a position that German influence, German capital, German commerce, German engineering, and German intelligence can compete on equal terms with other nations, in those countries, and among those populations, which are outside the pale of European civilization." [1]

No one can complain of such an aim; but none the less, when confronted with the avowal, men have to recognize that they are being confronted with force, and to remember the pregnant remark of the speaker that wars do not usually arise from definite aims but from incidental causes, in which the stronger party will usually prevail. Is "equality in terms" immediately recognized by both parties to such collisions? Has the world generally

[1] Delbrück. My italics.

been as satisfied with Germany's ideas of the equality of her rights, in Bismarck's day or in recent events, as it has been convinced of her superiority of force, and of her attempt to control in virtue of that superiority? The nations of the world have to regard the two facts: 1, a general rivalry in the regions named, complicated in South America by the Monroe Doctrine, and, 2, a German navy soon to be superior to every other, except the British. Should the latter retain its full present predominance, this, coupled with the situation of the British Islands, constitutes a check upon Germany; but that check removed, none approaching it remains. It follows that the condition and strength of Great Britain is a matter of national interest to every other community. With her far more liberal institutions and consequent weaker organization of force, replete to satiety with colonial possessions, she has no adequate

stimulus to aggression, least of all against the United States; nor has she in these days of organization the national efficiency, of which Germany is at present the consummate and unrivalled example.

Granting what has been said, it is clear that Great Britain occupies the key of the international position at a moment when international tension is increasing because all the nations eminent in industry and in the possession of capital are seeking outlets in the same quarters of the world; a moment of emphasized competition. Industry, production, capital, are not merely abstract terms; they represent the resources, upon the utilization of which depend the food, clothing, housing, and reasonable comforts of populations. The principals, therefore, to the present struggle, are not the governments but the peoples, of whom the several governments are the agents. If by the superior efficiency of one gov-

ernmental system there is brought into play military organized force, over and above the industrial and commercial force possessed, other nations have to look to combination among themselves to maintain the balance of opportunity. Owing to her situation and her navy, Great Britain occupies the key of the general situation, a condition supported by her extensive colonial system, especially the self-governing colonies; but in a competition of force she is inferior to Germany in efficient organization, and in concentrated numbers. Hence springs a necessity for all states, or rather for all peoples, who recognize the importance to themselves of equality or opportunity in the world markets, to consider with what attitude of mind, what comprehension of conditions, and what measure of force, they will approach the inevitable developments of the future. If one state be decisively stronger

than every other, the balance, as in former times, can be maintained only by understandings and combinations among the weaker.

Incident to this must be noted that the sea is the decisive factor, as in most industrial competitions. Under present conditions in Europe, notably in the prostration of Russia, coupled with the diversion of her energies eastward, Germany is entirely safe from invasion. Her navy is, or very soon will be, free to act in any part of the world, — except for the British navy. This removed, neutral, or fallen in power, Germany under present anticipations, which accord with reasonable probabilities, becomes the dominant naval state of the world, as well as the predominant country of Europe. Is it to be expected, moreover, that Great Britain will exert her power of constraint upon the movements of the German navy, in cases not involving her

own immediate interests, narrowly construed, when she has no guarantee of reciprocal support were conditions reversed? In the immaturity of American national power, at the time the Monroe Doctrine was enounced, the British fleet was a greater power, relatively, than it is now. Yet the American pronouncement, trivial as was then our naval force, was welcomed as a substantial support; and the two states, by their action, prevented the proposed transference across the sea of armies from combined Europe to interfere in an American quarrel. This reciprocal support was induced by the coincidence of interests.

Again, at the time of the War with Spain, in 1898, the writer has been assured, by an authority which he believes competent, that to a proposition made to Great Britain to enter into a combination to constrain the use of the United States power, — as Japan, also an extra-European nation,

in 1895 was constrained to give up her hold of Port Arthur and the surrounding territory by the joint action of France, Germany, and Russia, — the reply was not only a refusal to enter into such combination, but an assurance of active resistance to it, if attempted. I do not wish to attribute such an attitude to other than motives of interest, sagaciously interpreted. Nor would I appeal for acknowledgment of such a service to any sentiment; for sentiment, though powerful in nations, is excessively undependable, — liable to change. The question to be posed is, where, under existing conditions, broadly considered, is mutual support most likely to be found, because of common interest? and because of common political traditions, — no slight factor in international sympathies. It is as true now as when Washington penned the words, and will always be true, that it is vain to expect nations to

act consistently from any motive other than that of interest. This, under the name of "realism," is the frankly avowed motive of German statecraft. It follows from this, directly, that the study of interests, international interests, is the one basis of sound and provident policy for statesmen. This involves a wide knowledge of contemporary facts as well as power to appreciate them; but for a nation to exert its full weight in the world such knowledge and appreciation must be widespread among its plain people also. So only can the short vision common to most men expand to the prevision of national needs, and the timely provision of the necessary means for national self-assertion.

The United States now is compelled to see, not for the first time, that European politics affect American interests, directly and inevitably. In the determination of Germany to assert for herself a leading

position in world politics, and in her avowed plan to build a navy which, when completed, will exceed in strength that which Great Britain now possesses, and be superior to any as yet contemplated by any other nation, including the United States, she is exercising her indisputable right as an independent state, answerable to no other for her actions; but in so doing she places herself in a position of preponderant force over every other state singly, and that not only with reference to local defense, but in respect to her contentions wherever they may arise throughout the whole world. There is thus forming, not slowly but rapidly, a condition parallel in main features to one which confronted the United States throughout the first half of the last century, especially between the enunciation of the Monroe Doctrine and the end of the War of Secession.

When fully developed, the situation will

not be unprecedented, but it may be distinctly more ominous, because the competition among nations is vastly sharper than before 1860; a condition which itself arises largely from the change of Germany from an agricultural to an industrial community since 1870. Now, as before, antagonism will arise from the sea, the frontier common to ourselves and other maritime states. The world has long been accustomed to the idea of a preponderant naval power, coupling it accurately with the name of Great Britain; and it has been noted that such power, when achieved, is commonly found associated with commercial and industrial preëminence, the struggle for which is now in progress between Great Britain and Germany. Such preëminence forces a nation to seek markets, and, where possible, to control them to its own advantage by preponderant force, the ultimate expression of which is possession.

The Protective System, now almost universal, is an instance of force, of national power, used to constitute artificial advantages for national industry and commerce; and the vaunted free trade policy of Great Britain has rested upon a simple calculation of advantage, which being brought now into dispute, the fabric is shaken. Both are instances of national possession of territory, utilized or recommended as a means to obtain or to retain advantages otherwise than by free and open competition. Great Britain in 1878 acceded to the occupation by Austria of Bosnia and Herzegovina, though they continued in form provinces of Turkey; upon this followed tariff regulations which excluded British trade from a market before possessed. The now familiar phrase, "The open door," simply voices a protest against further trade exclusions in particular regions by territorial acquisitions; or by territorial control, however exerted or disguised.

Doubtless there is such a thing as purely commercial rivalry, resting solely upon industrial and economical efficiency; but, however effective in these respects a people may be, they are content with this only when they have not the power otherwise to control matters. When they have the power they will use it; and no ability to use compares with that of possessing the land. From this flow two results: the attempt to possess, and the organization of force by which to maintain possession already acquired. Very lately, when these lines had scarcely left the writer's pen, a German voice of no small authority has proclaimed the acquiescence of Germany in her exclusion, by preëmption, from further colonial acquisitions. No one is at liberty to doubt the perfect sincerity of such utterance; yet it remains that nations are constrained by opportunity when it arises, or willingly use it. Who in the open-

ing months of 1898 expected the United States to occupy the Philippines? Those islands certainly were not the cause, nor the object, of the war; and the present writer was personal witness of the extreme repugnance to the step on the part of the then Government. No one can foretell what a nation will do, or feel compelled to do. One thing only is certain: that where both parties think themselves right, force will prevail; moreover, it will be exercised when occasion offers. Not the present purpose of Germany, but the fact of the proposed preponderant German navy, coinciding with the condition that access to necessary markets is dependent upon alien legislation, will dictate Germany's future, as unforeseeable circumstances may determine.

In transmarine application of force, one element is indispensable; that is, a navy. Without naval strength, the exertion over-

sea of every other form of force is paralyzed. Further, a navy needs the ability to remain at will in any part of the globe where its services are required. This means naval bases, which themselves furnish an additional instance of the advantage of territorial possession. The cession of Kiao Chau by China to Germany was the result of a German armed demonstration, consequent upon injuries done to German citizens; but the Chancellor of the Empire told the legislature that the step was not sudden, unforeseen, nor disconnected. It was "the result of ripe reflection. We had long been convinced that we needed a territorial base in the extreme East." This statement is simply a specific formulation of the general necessity stated; itself an inevitable link in a chain of logical sequence: Industry, markets, control, navy, bases.

This series sums up the progress of the sea power of Great Britain, and because of

the impetus and traditions of that progress the United States was in continued diplomatic conflict with her, concerning disputed territorial possessions, from the time of Monroe's pronouncement until the end of the sectional war. This, too, despite the fact that Great Britain was already beginning to feel the load of territorial responsibility phrased in the words "the weary Titan." She had enough; some of her statesmen of that day thought far too much; but she had not yet got over the habit of wanting more, her industries were importunate, her navy supreme, her power on the sea uncontested. Fortunately for the American diplomatic contentions, the recollection of the harassment and unprofitableness of the War of 1812 was still vivid, the markets of the United States were valuable, the points, the occupation of which were successively at issue, not very consequential. Peace was not broken, and

the American claims for the most part were conceded.

Throughout all the agitations and governmental movements accompanying the conditions so far summarized, there is to be discerned ultimately a simple contest of forces, determined by considerations of conflicting national interests. Whether regulated by diplomacy, or brought to the arbitrament of war, whether between two communities, or between groups of states, it is power arrayed against power; power not in the sense of physical force only, but in a wide estimate of the advantages and disadvantages attendant upon the course of action. In place of such balance of power, which suggests necessarily two opposite scales, that is, an equilibrium dependent on essential antagonism, and therefore liable to frequent fluctuations, the last century witnessed the growth of the idea of concert, whereby all or some of the great

states, with other communities immediately affected, act together, in accord, for the solution of questions upon a basis of right, or of compromise, which when reached has the binding force of a contract. All general treaties, in a congress of nations, partake of this character; but the present conception of "concert" applies the method of general consultation and arrangement, whether by correspondence or by congress, to particular settlements, of matters minor but important. Thus a partial concert of the great Powers, to which Germany refused her participation, apparently because of particular relations with the now deposed Sultan, Abdul Hamid, resulted in a joint garrisoning of Crete by France, Great Britain, Italy, and Russia, as a measure tending to maintain quiet between Christian and Mahomedan inhabitants, who looked for political union and for support to Greece and Turkey respectively; a circum-

stance which embittered the relations between these two countries and threatened an outbreak dangerous to the peace of Europe. Again, the Conference at Algeciras, five years ago, was a concert of the Powers, which produced a mandate to France and Spain, as the states most directly interested, to take certain measures in Morocco. In such cases the result reached represents, in form at least, agreement, not a balance of antagonisms.

In endeavoring to put aside force, substituting for it reason and mutual concession, this resort is in idea cognate to arbitration, as balance of power is to forcible settlement. Unhappily, such agreements in form represent also, too often, a mere resultant of forces, and are liable to disturbance as the forces vary. A very recent instance is the disregard of the Berlin Treaty of 1878, by Austria, in changing the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina,

authorized by the treaty, into political incorporation. The concert of the treaty thus disappears into an antagonism of Powers. Germany backs Austria; while Russia, under German pressure, the precise character of which it is not necessary to know, throws over her understanding with Great Britain and France, whereby the three stood together, opposed to a step which, without the concert of Europe, deprived Turkey of her formal suzerainty over the two provinces, and which was regarded by the minor kingdom of Servia as distinctly injurious to her reasonable ambitions. The sullen resentment of Russia under this thinly veiled coercion was manifested diplomatically by the Czar's labored avoidance of Austrian territory in his diplomatic journey from Russia to Italy, in October, 1909. Not till the following February was a formal end put to a condition of estrangement which menaced the peace of Europe,

in case of any difficult question arising in the Balkans. In the outcome, the action of Austria stands an accomplished fact; accomplished, not with, but despite, the concert of Europe, and modified only by certain pecuniary compensations acceptable to the financial needs of Turkey, pressed by an internal revolution which had afforded the occasion for the Austrian aggression. When such an outcome is reached, the last state is worse than the first. The antagonism of forces revives, intensified by the evidence that a formal concert is liable to be cast aside, at the arbitrary decision of one of the parties, whenever convenience or imagined necessity occurs. Mutual confidence has been shaken, if not destroyed.

Whether inevitable or not, such a result illustrates that the states of the world are not yet in a condition to dispense with the institution of organized force. There are contentions which a state will not submit

to either the deliberation of a concert or the adjudication of a tribunal; in which its action is maintained, or is checked, as the case may be, only by force. It may be interesting to note in this connection that the Balance of Power is analogous to competition in industrial and commercial life, while the Concert of Europe has much in common with the operation of a Trust. Although it has not attained the feature of absorption of all into one which is the characteristic of the Trust, it does concentrate the political adjudication of Europe in the hands of a combination before which the weaker companies — I mean Powers — have to bend.

Without undertaking to measure circumstances which may extenuate such an action as the annexation of the two Balkan provinces or increase condemnation of it, it is evident that, in a clear instance of contract disregarded, there is a moral

element that affects the whole world. At the bottom of all satisfactory relations, social, financial, or international, lies confidence. Without confidence there is no security; the extreme of confidence shaken is panic. No business man needs a more vivid illustration of what a breach of treaty, sustained by force, means to that business of nations which we call international politics. This has been more or less the condition of Europe since the Franco-Prussian War; for that not only revealed a supreme military power, but also finally constituted, as an organic whole, a state in which the faculty of organization in all departments of life transcends that of every other member of the European family; including therein the United States, as at least very near of kin to that family.

The military organization, the army, is only a particular instance of German organization of energy; of which the distinguish-

ing characteristic is that the entire social order, formally concentrated in the national government, originates, supervises, fosters, and develops the directive agencies of national activity, to an extent and with a success not approached elsewhere. Thus is accomplished a massing of forces, which tells in industrial and commercial life just as it does in military combinations. A Trust is an organized massing of forces; and the power of trusts we know. In Germany such massing by the government is peculiarly easy and effectual; for the German man of to-day is the product of centuries of political and social conditions, in which government, good or bad, has overshadowed the individual. This has been partly from the traditions of absolute government; still more because the smallness of most of the German states permitted such government to seek out, reach, and come home to the personal life of each

subject, to a degree not elsewhere attained.

Thus the individual German of to-day is particularly adapted by past environment, and very possibly by hereditary characteristics, to fall in with the scheme of governmental control, which seems to be the tendency now in all civilized communities. The liberty of the individual, undirected and unrestrained by the community, except where trespassing on the common right, or on the rights of others, has been the ideal of Great Britain and the United States. It is yielding now everywhere to the need of restraint, just because it is being discovered that otherwise the combinations of individuals do threaten common rights. In sheer self-defense, communities are forced to measures which, while socialistic in form, are not so in spirit, when their aim is not to substitute governmental action for that of the individual, but only to regulate the latter; just as in every age, this, that, or

the other element of a political society has required control, because developing overweening strength. It may be noted that governmental regulation introduces a competitive factor into the social order, by setting up the interest of the community at large against that of individuals or corporations when the power of these becomes excessive; whereas the Socialist ideal, that the state should assume directive control and possession of all social activities, constitutes a monopoly to which no natural efficient corrective exists, — a gigantic monopoly and Trust.

In this contemporary tendency to a higher exhibition of organization, Germany is found with a lead which in so far, in methods and in aptitudes, gives her a start over all other states, and constitutes for her an opportunity to retrieve those disadvantages under which a century ago she began her course; divided then politically,

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and, as far as regarded the mass of the community, backward, — socially, economically, and commercially. The customs union, which freed commerce and industry from being trammeled by tariffs every few miles, dates only from 1835. The forwardness of Prussia in promoting this change was a decisive step towards the primacy over Austria which was afterwards achieved; but a quarter of a century later, from 1862 to 1866, the stage of political development in Prussia received curious illustration. The lower house of the legislature was defied by Bismarck, in support of whose measures the upper house laid taxes continuously refused by the other chamber.

The notable political feature in this was that the people continued to pay, apparently without serious demur; a marked contrast to the English people under the levy of ship money, and to the American under the Stamp Act. True, the Prussian

tax was for the reorganization and development of the army which placed her at the head of Germany, and in the victories of which the modern German Empire found birth; but equally the ship money was for the development of a navy to which Great Britain has owed her ascendency, and the need of which was recognized, while the Stamp Act alleged, not without reason, the requirements of defense for the community upon which it bore. The submission of the Prussians under similar conditions is significant as indicative of a popular characteristic which lends itself plastically to the moulding force of a strong government, without at the same time losing the initiative of the individual within his own sphere of activity. There seems in this a sympathy between the nature of the government and of the governed which carries an assurance of strength not always to be found. Be this as it may, it appears certain that in

an age of organization of force Germany stands at the head of all nations, in the acquired power of framing and accepting systematic organization.

With the strength conferred by this inherent and developed talent for systematically organizing civil activities, — the economical element of power, — through the concerted force of the community, coöperates the military element, in an army of unrivalled efficiency, drawing upon a population now greater than that of any one European state west of Russia, and with a rate of increase superior to that of any other. Since the war with France, in 1870, the growth of population in Germany has been fifty per cent, from forty millions to sixty; and it advances at the rate of eight hundred thousand annually. As regards numbers and quality, therefore, the army can hold the lead it has, while as against a possible combination of other

states it has the recognized military advantage of central position. Disregarding for the moment other elements of military strength, the other great Powers of Europe, — Russia, Italy, France, Great Britain, — are distributed around the massed territory of Germany and Austria-Hungary. Imagining a coalition, such as those against Louis XIV and Napoleon, this entails of course liability to attack upon more sides than one; but military experience affirms that, other factors remaining the same, the central position gains much more from the ability to strike successive blows at several foes than it loses from the risk of simultaneous offensive action by them. Concentration of impact, whereby superior force is brought against inferior, is greatly facilitated by an original concentration of position, enabling movement to be by lines which in military terms are called interior; that is, briefly, shorter lines. These in turn

are equivalent to more rapid action, and so to time saved; the famous five minutes which the proverb affirms may make the difference between victory and defeat.

Combined action is for these reasons more easy to him who occupies the central parts of a circle than for those whose territory distributes them disconnectedly around the circumference. This factor of military strength rests with the alliance between Germany and Austria-Hungary; and the natural advantage of position is confirmed and developed by a railroad system, most of it under the immediate control of the government, and constituted with a view to strategic as well as commercial transportation, thus utilizing to the utmost the military opportunities conferred by interior lines. These considerations cannot but weld the two governments in mutual support, now that their reciprocal position in the modern Europe is accepted by them-

selves; nor does there appear in the particular ambitions of either, or in general international relations, any inducement to division between them commensurate to the advantages obtained by combination. The united mass of their territories stretches across Europe from water to water, from the North Sea and Baltic to the Adriatic, with well defined commercial and military interests, which, in the problematical future of Turkey, make striking the Mediterranean in the Ægean also, at Salonica, a natural ambition.

Of such views the annexations of a year ago are symptoms; as is the proposition to build four Austrian *Dreadnoughts*, — the military correlative of the commercial advance. Granting the position on the Ægean achieved, or command of the Adriatic by naval supremacy there, adequate naval strength will assure the control of the region intervening between the Ægean and the

Adriatic, west of a north and south line drawn through Widdin. Here the interest of Austria clashes with that of Italy, as well as with the general sensitiveness of Europe concerning conditions in the nearer East. It must be remembered that only a half-century has elapsed since Austria held large parts of Italian territory, including Venice and Milan, with a tradition also of expansion along the Italian peninsula. For a brief moment, 1718–1733, she held also Naples and Sicily. Forced from this line of advance, the same tradition and expectation of commercial advantage have been transferred to the other side of the Adriatic, in the Balkan peninsula. The former opposition of Italy naturally follows this movement also, regarding command of the Adriatic as essential to Italian security; for this sea is nowhere more than one hundred and fifty miles wide, narrowing at its outlet to less than forty. Italy

cannot view with quietude such an inland water, coterminous with her whole eastern frontier, controlled by a superior foreign navy based along one coast. With this strong inherited and present prepossession can scarcely fail to coöperate sympathy with the romantic country of the present queen of Italy, who is Montenegrin. There lingers, moreover, in Italy resentment that Italian populations, notably at Trieste and Trent, remain "unredeemed" subjects of Austria. Amid these conflicting desires it is by no means necessary to strike a balance of probabilities as to the issue. It is only requisite to recognize the unstable conditions, and their proximity to the meeting place of the East and West, the great center of old world politics, ancient and modern. Of this the exponents are Constantinople and Alexandria, which get their names from two of the world's greatest statesmen and conquerors.

In this powerful alliance of the two mid-Europe states, the several ambitions of which have been illustrated by recent events, — by the German naval programme and by the Balkan annexations of Austria, — the predominant partner is Germany. Her assistance has been decisive in the recent action, in which Austria, besides motives of immediate expediency, has been actuated also avowedly by an intention to make herself felt in the world. In the particular instance, said the prime minister, it was necessary to take matters in hand, because otherwise they might have developed against Austria. That is, the young Turks, who had just achieved their revolution at Constantinople, might have objected, as they gained strength, to an incorporation of the provinces with Austria; just as they have refused, under threat of war, to allow Greece to acquire Crete. The intention was avowed also to continue

an active foreign policy, based upon the idea that Austria-Hungary should occupy to the full her place in the world; accessory to which is extension for trade towards the Ægean and Mediterranean. Should the nation as a whole support this purpose, Austria would stand no longer in a doubtful background, a spectacle of dissension and disunion, because of the intestine struggles of the diverse races which compose her empire, but by a determined external policy would create a center of national interest which should compact a national unity. Hampered though she is financially, this object, and the commercial advantage which access to the sea gives, must continue to impel her in the same direction, despite oppositions which have shown latterly their impotence, when confronted with the dangers of a European war under existing conditions. These conditions are the present disability of Russia,

and the military power of the two central European Empires. With this demonstration of the influence inherent in their united action, a certain solidarity between the two may safely be assumed, as one of the most settled factors in present international relations.

In acknowledgment of her timely exertion in behalf of her ally, Germany will certainly expect, and, in lively expectation of a similar attitude in future contingencies, will doubtless receive, throughout a future to which no limit is apparent, the support of Austria-Hungary in the various measures of her policy, whenever these bring her into conflict with other governments. This means that in so far as world politics depend upon European conditions, — still one of its most important elements, — a state that has a controversy with Germany, concerning any part of the world, has to reckon with Austria also. This was

conspicuously the case in Morocco; and the two stood together, apart from the European concert, in the Cretan business, and still continue so to stand. In the present *entente* between France, Great Britain, and Russia, should serious difficulty arise between any one of the three and Germany — a circumstance by no means unprecedented — the other two, if contemplating intervention, would have to take account of Austria as well. Should France in such case decide to bring her navy to reinforce the British, she must look to see her land frontier threatened not by Germany only but by Austria, in the conflagration which might ensue. Evidently also, should the United States in any part of the world come into collision with German purposes or policy, any effect that momentary European conditions might exert upon Germany's action would be modified by the certainty of Austria's at-

titude. These are concrete instances of the balance of powers; the distinguishing feature at present being that in the one scale is power concentrated in mass, by situation, and by necessary mutual dependence; in the other, power disseminated, and with no necessary element of cohesion except that of counter-balancing a preponderance otherwise irresistible. Experience does not warrant dependence upon this motive to overcome the influence of momentary advantages and dangers, and to weld action into sustained coöperation against more remote contingencies, however probable. The recent scattering of the Triple *Entente* before the Triple Alliance is simply a demonstration of where the power lay.

In these unstable conditions there is only one force capable of exerting an effectual check. That is the British navy. If maintained in due preponderance, this

is capable of perpetuating the rôle played by Great Britain for two centuries: that of a determinative factor. It possesses this power for two reasons: that it is not the creation of an alliance, but of a single state, power concentrated in one hand; and that that state, in addition to insular security, still possesses a wealth adequate to the maintenance of what has come in our day to be called the "Two Power Standard." This Two Power Standard is simply a new definition of an old idea. Throughout the eighteenth century, especially about the time of the American War of Independence, it was an accepted maxim of British statesmen that the navy must be greater than that of the combined fleets of the two Bourbon monarchies, France and Spain. The alliance between these two — the Family Compact — was in form perpetual, and in substance assured, under the conditions of those times;

in this resembling the present conjunction of Austria and Germany. That is, France and Spain then were bound together, not merely by dynastic sympathies, but by clear, evident, pressing need of mutual support.

To-day the Two Power Standard is less specific in application, a circumstance which testifies to the ill defined state of international relations which followed the Franco-German War, and continued to within a very few years. The phrase affirms, in general terms, that national security requires that the British navy should exceed in force the united fleets of any two other Powers; because the nation is dependent, not only for military defense but for mere existence, for food, for commerce, and for raw materials of industry, upon control of the sea. There is a division of opinion as to whether the United States should be accounted a possible factor in a

hostile combination; the argument of those who would thus include her resting apparently upon the expediency of taking account of all possibilities, rather than upon the belief that there now exist any probable causes of difference, particularly of such a nature as to induce the United States into an alliance for war, contrary to its traditions. Against this it can be urged that, in the closeness of commercial relations, in community of speech and of political traditions, and in the interests of Canada, necessarily involved in a war between Great Britain and the United States, there exist deterrent motives of a force far exceeding those of any probable dispute.

It has been said that a dominating principle with the late Lord Salisbury was that no controversy with the United States should be permitted to approach a rupture. Whether truly attributed or not, this illustrates the general fact that in the

horoscope of every nation there usually is one other Power, accordant relations with which are of primary importance. To Prussia, in the days of Russia's unshaken power, it was Russia; to the German Empire now, it is Austria-Hungary. The change was formulated by Bismarck in 1879, against the strong prepossessions of the old Emperor. Having in view, not the British Islands only, but the other constituent parts of the Empire, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, — all with Pacific frontiers and cherishing political incentives common with our Pacific states, — and especially in view of the British navy, there is strong reason to believe that international considerations should assign to the British Empire this prominent place in the understanding of Americans.

This is not a matter of sympathies, except so far as such may be inferred from the spirit of a common political tradition;

which, however differing in manifestation, in local external institutions, has had its own particular and isolated development, through England and her colonies, during the fifteen centuries since its first fathers brought its seeds with them from the German shores of the North Sea. The conclusion depends upon a cool calculation of possibilities, an estimate of balances, a recognition that the United States can no longer stand apart, nor proceed safely without a somewhat formulated conception of particular, as well as of general, relations among states. It is a matter of public knowledge, that in certain lines of American policy great care has been taken to act, if not in concert, at least in consultation and agreement with the European community of states; and this in matters not between us and them, but in which they and we have interests, like, yet independent. This is an implicit admission of

entanglement in that net known as "world politics;" a confession that the United States can no longer accept America and the Monroe Doctrine as the final limitation of her relations to the community of States.

We always have had, of course, particular relations with particular states; the change is, that, whereas formerly these stood apart one from the other, in water-tight compartments as far as concerned American negotiations, now the unrest of the East, its need of development, and the opportunity for Western industry and capital to find remuneration in filling that need, have constituted a common object, in which European and American interests meet. This remark is no less true of Central and South America, and of the Monroe Doctrine as involved in them. In these contacts there arise occasions in which the interests are the same; others

in which they collide. Both compel groupings of the Powers concerned. At times solidarity of diplomatic action is found incumbent; at others there is divergence; in all is an interplay of forces, which makes isolated national action injudicious and self-frustrative. The question follows: Are such various incidents to be treated merely independently, as they arise, on the plan of opportunism? or can there be recognized underlying communities of political ideals, or considerations of forces, by steady regard to which national policy can be equally consistent and yet probably decisively stronger?

It must not be thought that such a point of view looks to formal alliances. It is one thing to act habitually in coöperation with a man because of reliance upon him, based on knowledge and experience; quite another to bind yourself so to act for a prolonged future, whether defined or

undefined. Even if the United States did not have a traditional policy, wisely based upon an avoidance of lasting alliances contracted at the dictation of a transient opportunism, it would still be useless to persuade its people to such engagements; and quite ineffective to contract them, unless supported by a strongly accordant and instructed popular sentiment. But, if there be such popular sentiment, resting upon a comprehensive understanding of international conditions and relations, the advantages of alliance are secured without its drawbacks, and would appear in the general policy of the country. The Monroe Doctrine itself is an illustration of the power of popular sentiment. It derives from statesmen its formulation, its developments, and such precision as it has attained; but its strength as a national motive depends upon the continuous prepossession of the people, not always per-

fectly clear in apprehension, but sufficiently so to sustain action. It has no other binding force, no artificial force of compact.

At an early stage of this discussion I took occasion to quote the comment of Bishop Stubbs, that the Balance of Power is the key to the History of Modern Europe; of the period from 1500 to 1800. This profound historical student, whose methods affected above all others his contemporaries of his own nation, remarks also that in the preceding era, which we call mediæval history, the several peoples had developed interiorly, without organized external action, one upon another, as states. Nations then had not attained that individuality of life which is the necessary antecedent to strictly national action. They were in a formative period; and because of the large number of independent subdivisions within a territory, the multitude of the actors prevented any approach to a

definiteness of action that can be realized or formulated. As he expresses it, there was no drama; only confused agitation.

For instance, there is a great advance to simplicity, and so to comprehensibleness, when England, Ireland, and Scotland form a single state; when France is no longer an assemblage of feudal tenures, but a consolidated kingdom; and, in our own day, when the German Diet of independent sovereignties has become a united Empire, with its central executive and common legislature. So, too, the United States, as a unified group, presents a tangible object for observation and consideration, as compared with the formless mass of thirteen, which issued in chaotic intestine struggle from their common War of Independence.

The Balance of Power is the expression of the stage in European history which followed the successful efforts, by which many members thus constituted them-

selves into several organic bodies, called states. This also evidently is still the stage in which Western civilization is. The consequence has been to constitute the separate states into a community, by imparting to each and all a common idea, — that of balance of power as essential to national independence. However discordant the interests of the several members, however diverse the national characters which have resulted from the original differences of raw material — heredity — and from the centuries of varying political environment, the common instinct of self-preservation has drawn out and sustained this common conception of statehood, in the holding of which they find relationship. The Monroe Doctrine itself is an enunciation of a balance of powers, by the formulation of which the United States has established relationship and inclusion in the European community — not the Eu-

ropean system — so far as membership is concerned. The objection to Oriental immigration on a large scale is another unnoted admission of the same condition of relationship, to nations other than our own.

Thus, as in the Middle Ages many provinces, many lords, at divers times and by divers roads, found their way to unity, in one country, or under one sovereign, thus forming a state; so the community of states, of this tradition, is feeling its way towards a unity of its own. This, so far as attained, shall be the expression of its common antecedents, when the West was growing up, apart from the East, preparing for that stage in the course of history when the personages of the drama will be the two groups, of the West and the East, which hitherto have grown up apart, as once did the countries of Europe. The whole development of international law,

which is the standard code of international relations, is an outcome of the struggles of the community of European states, including the United States, dominated by the idea of independence; of the sovereignty of the state, no matter where the attribute of sovereignty was lodged in any particular form of government. As has been well said by a German writer, "In the sovereignty of states the individuality and independence of nations come to expression. Only because states are sovereign can the individuality and unity of the peoples they comprise develop and flourish." This conception of independence, underlying the development of the European community, has been common to all; and to the results all have contributed a share, as they also have in them a common inheritance.

III

RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EAST AND THE WEST

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IT is scarcely surprising, at this particular stage of progress, which represents the development of the European family after four hundred years, to find growing up a fresh conception of Balance of Power; that between the East and the West. The late war between Russia and Japan has signalized the inception of this idea, for the evident reason that in it one of the European family has been overthrown by an Eastern nation. Such a conspicuous fact necessarily arouses popular attention, which is incapable of looking underneath the surface to qualifying circumstances, or even of seeing modifying facts. Besides, whatever deductions

be made, the excellence of the Japanese performance remains confessed.

The issue has been hailed throughout the East with a sympathy which is less that of brotherhood among themselves than that of a community of opposition to Western preponderance. Since the West and the East — neglecting the Turkish Empire — first came into close and effective contact, some two hundred years ago, the relative conditions, broadly speaking, have been those of highly developed concentrated force, political and military, on the part of the West, confronting and dominating communities individually inferior in organized power, and wholly incapable of coalescing in mutual support. The hundreds of millions of East Indians have been for the most part more loosely knit than were the fiefs of a country in the height of feudalism. The yet vaster numbers of China have been in no sense a nation; and, besides, the

profession of arms has been held in a disrepute which leaves any people at the mercy of one more warlike. Japan up to fifty years ago had secluded herself from all possibility of sharing the benefits of European advance, which since that time she has so ably appropriated. The backward political organization and development of other Eastern countries needs no insistence.

Under these circumstances, the Western nations, while all the time quarreling among themselves, observed towards those of the Farther East substantially the same line of conduct; the result being that in this respect the West has been towards the East a homogeneous preponderating power, such as in Europe was successively Spain, France, Great Britain, and now, on the Continent, Germany. The Turkish Empire, which once itself played the part of a great concentrated nationality towards a divided Christendom, and the Mahomedan peo-

ples in general, while retaining their national form and recognized independence, have been continually compelled to loss of territory, or to concessions inconsistent with independence; because unable to compete with the West in either political or military efficiency, or among themselves to combine resistance.

Such conditions, the outcome of centuries, are not to be overturned in a day. Japan, indeed, has shown what may be effected in a generation; but Japan, relatively to other eastern populations, is a small compact mass, welded into unity by the narrowness of its territory and by the long exclusion of alien influences. Besides the particular moral characteristics bred in this seclusion, and exhibited magnificently in the recent war, the transmission of energy throughout the body of the nation has been made comparatively easy by the relative fewness and the concentration of the people,

together with the military tradition, and the local effectiveness of command, inherited from the daimio system. Japan was also most fortunate in that the hour brought forth the men. The conjunction is necessary: the man and the hour. History abounds in opportunities lost for want of the leader. Japan found more than one.

Nevertheless, although time, probably much time, will be needed, there can be no doubt that we are now in presence of an idea which with growing force is moving that bigger half of mankind that we call the East. Its manifestations are often crude, and it is easy to exaggerate their significance as well as to undervalue it. It appears as yet to find its impulse — outside of Japan — in impatience of Western control, or interposition, rather than in the sober spirit of internal regeneration which makes a community fit for self-government. The example of Japan in this does not seem

to impress. Mere discontent is not a constructive force; nor does there seem to appear the man, or class, in India or China, conspicuously fitted for the difficult task of leadership. They have been affected greatly by the achievements of Japan; but it may be doubted whether they would be willing to submit to her guidance, or, if they did, find it more to their liking than that of the Westerner. The Koreans apparently think the Japanese fully as hard to endure as the East Indian does the Briton; or, as our anti-imperialist friends tell us, the Filipino does the American rule.

In India, as in the Philippines, change, the transmutation of idea into accomplishment, can scarcely fail to be slow, because of the presence in both of the superior Western organizing power, political and social, in effective operation; dealing with communities which are not homogeneous in race or faith. Internal oppositions sap the

strength of such discontent as may exist. There is also among the inhabitants sufficient appreciation of the substantial material advantages of the foreign rule, and of the probable consequences of its withdrawal, to make the mass of the people acquiescent; tolerant of that which they may dislike, of the lesser evil. The propaganda of discontent, and of independence, is chiefly among those sufficiently instructed to know about Western methods, but not so historically enlightened as to appreciate the toil of the centuries which have fitted Western people to develop and use them. It is improbable that the political institutions of either India or the Philippines will undergo great alteration in the near future, except as conceded by the controlling country. Both the United States and Great Britain are making such concessions.

With China the outlook is different.

Like other Eastern people she has been stirred by the Japanese victories over a Western state; and she has long known, often through severe experience, the material superiority of Western development. For a short time after the Peace of Portsmouth it seemed as though the eyes of the more progressive element in the country had turned towards Japan, as to an intermediary, a cognate people; through whose demonstrated aptness to learn, and to appropriate, the Chinese might more easily and sympathetically acquire that which the West had to give. The mere matter of nearness, of shorter, less expensive journey, was also of account. Chinese students swarmed to Japan; but the tide soon slackened and turned. However drawn together by repugnance to Western influence, the two countries are too close, and the characteristics of the people too different, for political approximation; much less alli-

ance. Geographical proximity is a recognized source of international difficulty; and with the three countries, China, Japan, and Russia, finding in Manchuria not only a common point of contact, but intersecting and clashing interests, there is a reasonable assurance that, even if peace be maintained, there will be continual political antagonism and watchfulness. For some time to come Manchuria will be to the Farther East what Belgium in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was to Western Europe.

Despite various buffets of the past, and the unmilitary disposition of the people, China retains, partly in virtue of her immense mass, alike of territory and of inhabitants, the undisturbed essentials of national solidarity. To constitute her a potent world force, there remains only to bring these attributes into effective operation; an attainment which will doubtless be protracted by her very bigness, the inertia of

which has constituted for her a defense. Although her territory has undergone frequent encroachment, the native government retains its control. Contemplated division, the institution or recognition of divers spheres of influence, has been in most part averted. Her population is racially homogeneous, though marked by provincial distinctions, and by dialects mutually unintelligible; circumstances inseparable from great expanse of territory with poor intercommunications. Those who know them best find in the individual Chinese a solidity of character which gives promise of great achievement.

This solidity has indeed in the past assumed the form of stolidity in conservatism; of an almost impregnable satisfaction with everything native, leading to that confidence of superiority which is the worst foe of progress. But latterly light has penetrated, the process of self-knowl-

edge by comparison with other standards is begun, and is bearing fruit. The fact is significant, as well as interesting, that a railroad one hundred and twenty-two miles long, from Peking northwest to Kalgan, has just been constructed by Chinese management alone, and without foreign financial assistance. All the engineers are Chinese, the chief being a graduate of Yale. An extension of one hundred and fifty miles is planned, to be executed in similar independence of outside aid; but the rejection of foreign capital will entail inadequate means for rapid building, and protract completion. The two circumstances illustrate China's past, present, and probable future. They evidence determination to break the bonds of past dependence, yet at the same time show dependence inevitable for a long time to come, until resources accumulate; until development overtake aspiration. It is with this inter-

vening period that "The Open Door" is concerned. Close observers tell us that national feeling also, as distinguished from racial, the conception, however elementary, of the community as a state, is making distinct advance. This is the necessary first step towards realizing the national unity which will enable China to take her place among the nations, relieving her from the attitude of pure and usually ineffective defense to which she has been hitherto limited.

Whatever may prove to be the character and duration of the process, the Eastern countries will have to undergo the same formative period as those of Europe, and of North America. From a bundle of communities, too loosely associated even to be called a fagot, they have yet to make their way to nationality. The expanse and population of India and China render it unlikely that this stage can be passed as

rapidly as in Japan; nor will their inherited political aptitudes enable them to parallel the power and ease with which the thirteen States of the American Union encountered and successfully passed the crisis of their constitutional history, between 1783 and 1789. On the other hand, the facilities for intercommunication which they will adopt from Western civilization — which Western rule has already bestowed in large measure upon India — will enable movements towards consolidation of national power, when once fairly under way, to progress with a quickness and sureness not possible to mediæval Europe during its corresponding period.

Meantime, while the Eastern community of nations is constituting itself, political relations with Europe and America will continue and develop; just as, throughout the mediæval period, such relations existed between the European communities of those

days and that which we now know as the nearer East. The advance of the Saracens to southern France, the Crusades, the progress of the Turkish Empire in Europe, the wave of which touched Vienna in one direction and Malta in another, are familiar instances of political relations, under the religious and social traditions and national aspirations of that age. A Christendom of imperfect nationalities permitted a vigorous united Islam to threaten its heart; the consolidation of nationalities arrested the danger. Yet at the very moment of arrest, the external power was courted by some Christian states, and became a make-weight in the long struggle between the House of Bourbon and that of Austria. Not infrequently, when France and the Empire were at war, the energies of the latter were weakened, and its efforts distracted, by the attacks of the Turks on the other side; in its rear. Later, and now, the condition

of the Turkish Empire fastens the attention of Europe, and is an increasing source of menace, because of the conflict of interests centering in the Levant. Over a half century ago, in the Crimean War, two Christian Powers combined against a third, and in alliance with Turkey, on account of clashing interests in the Turkish dominions; and only two years have passed since a like danger of war from divergent interests has been encountered.

These particular matters have touched the United States, if at all, too remotely for demonstration; even, perhaps, for detection. Yet, inasmuch as they affect the equilibrium of Europe, they may affect her by their influence in other parts of the world, where the United States comes into immediate touch with the Powers which maintain that equilibrium. It cannot be to her a matter of indifference should events weaken a nation upon whose general accord

she can count, and strengthen one less likely to act with her. Occurrences in the East within the last ten years have gravely affected the balance of power in Europe itself. It is said, and plausibly, that Germany recognizes a new European era since the defeat of Russia by Japan. She is relieved on one side, to such an extent as to remove serious anxiety on any side from the Franco-Russian alliance; a situation still further confirmed by the assured fidelity to her of Austria-Hungary. It can readily be seen that such relief on land can take the form of larger expenditure diverted to the navy. This reduces, or will reduce, the relative power of the British navy; or else cause Great Britain a largely increased expenditure, which in itself is weakening to a nation.

It seems possible, even probable, that Great Britain made a mistake of policy, in more ways than one, in crippling Russia

by her alliance with Japan. It was to her interest that Russia should be deeply engaged in the Far East, because that diverted her by so far from Constantinople, Suez, the Persian Gulf, and India. Russia had not power to carry on in all these directions. It was also to the interest of Great Britain that Russia should weigh upon the shoulders of the present German Empire, as once the Turks did upon that of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. By the disastrous events in Manchuria, and their consequences, that weight has been removed, probably for a generation. Thus one event in the Far East, the issue of the Russo-Japanese War, has been assured by the act of one European government; and that event has materially affected the equipoise of Europe itself, to the disadvantage of the intervener, who now is compelled to enormous efforts to retrieve the loss.

We are here of course in the region of

estimation, rather than that of demonstration; but that Japan, even as things were, had well nigh reached the limit of her financial strength at the end of the war, is so far sure as to make it reasonably certain that the British alliance, in its first form only, was a determinative factor; the precise effect that the British navy for two centuries has exercised in world politics. Had the result been other, been more nearly a drawn battle between the two contestants, more entirely exhaustive financially to both, but less injurious to Russian prestige, the influence upon that diplomatic contention, "The Open Door," would have been distinctly modified. The Open Door is but another way of expressing Balance of Power; for, while conspicuously just, and making for peace, — as the balance of power has, — it means simply equal opportunity, just as balance of power means equal independence. But, like the balance

of power, the maintenance of the open door is the result of a balancing of forces; the forces of the various states interested in the commerce and development of China, to which the phrase applies.

What the origin of this phrase I do not know; but it is certain that the United States has been very active and prominent, if not indeed foremost, in the exposition and maintenance of the principle. The words before quoted, of the German writer Delbrück, sum up the attitude of all states, including the United States, towards this question; determined "to enforce that German influence, German capital, German commerce, German engineering, and German intelligence can compete on equal terms with other nations." It is of course desired by all that this reasonable aim should be reached peaceably; and it is all the more likely so to be reached, if it is clearly understood from the beginning

that the rights claimed will be sustained by force, if necessary. There being no misunderstanding, there is less likely to be a falling out because of measures taken in ignorance of another's attitude.

But it must be clearly borne in mind all the time that the nations, speaking generally, are intent each upon its own advantage, according to its own lights, which are not likely always, or even usually, to coincide with the views of others. Railroads, for instance, are a very common form of investment of capital, and of employment of labor, with which goes a well ascertained influence. Consequently, the building of railroads is an opportunity which comes under the head of Open Door, and latterly there has seemed to be an instance of leaving the United States in the cold; to deny her that which a German Chancellor has called "a place in the sun." The attempt was met, and successfully

met, by the firm self-assertion of the United States Government. Very many railroads will have to be built in China, within the next generation. So also the integrity of the Chinese Empire is essential to the open door. When territory is occupied and administered by a foreign state, under the terms of a lease, as has been done often in the past, not only is there danger of such occupation passing into annexation, as happened to Bosnia and Herzegovina a year ago, and seems now close at hand in Korea, but even such modified possession tends to bring the territory under the national customs, closing the open door in part or wholly.

Questions of this nature, and they are multifold in kind and origin, fall under the head of the Open Door. In meeting them the United States necessarily becomes involved in understandings with other nations — European nations. To undertake

alone the maintenance of the Open Door would be to establish a protectorate, and essentially to abandon that equality which is the spirit of the policy. As an example of such questions, there is constantly recurrent uncertainty and discussion as to transactions in Manchuria, where Japanese or Russian occupation, coincident with that of China, raises doubts as to whether this or that measure, taken by one or another, observes the just rights of China herself, or of other nations as interested in equality of opportunity. It is vain, too, to deny that, while there may be accord in the principle of the open door, its very observance entails competition; and competition, in trade, has a strong tendency to utilize any opportunity to obtain advantage. Protection, to which almost the whole world is now committed, is the utilization of the opportunity, which possession or occupation gives, to obtain com-

mercial advantages by other means than simple competition of skill and energy. The industrial, financial, and commercial worlds abound in expedients of similar character. The American Trusts have illustrated the tendency.

Having then to deal in this matter with other nations, almost all European, and recognizing that the accord rests ultimately upon national power, force, upon which all order, social and political, also rests, not indeed for its sanctions, but for its maintenance, it cannot be indifferent to the United States when the relative power of the European countries interested varies. On the contrary, every such fluctuation in Europe will concern her. It may concern her in many parts of the world; but it cannot fail to do so in the Pacific and China. It is not a matter of indifference to the United States that now Russia is weak, that Germany is building a huge

navy, that the British navy is declining, relatively, owing to the debility of a government which in the way of expenditure has assumed obligations in seeming excess of its power to meet by sound financial methods. In the past, even, the relative force of other states has mattered to America more than most Americans realize. It might have been a very serious concern to us if, in 1823, the navy of Great Britain had so far declined below those of the Continent as to be unable to forbid the transport of the allied troops to South America, to reduce the Spanish colonies to submission. In 1814, it was the difficulty of the European situation that led Great Britain to abandon so readily her demands for territorial concessions after the War of 1812. We owed our independence, at the period it was achieved, to the fact that the British navy then had declined, relatively to those of allied France and Spain.

This at least was the opinion of Washington, whose observation at the time led him to the conclusion that "we have reached the end of our tether." Had France and Great Britain been able to arrange a basis of agreement, 1861–1863, success in the War of Secession would have been very problematical.

It seems indeed not impossible, nor even very improbable, that the exigencies of the balance of power, which to-day as formerly is the key to international European politics, may have the result of neutralizing, or at least of reducing, European influence in world politics as regards the Farther East, unless the present struggle for naval supremacy is either arrested or decided. Concentration, such as that of the British navy now in its home waters, is effected by drawing back distant detachments from their advanced positions. In principle and practice it is absolutely correct; but it in-

volves necessarily a certain temporary loss of control over the positions abandoned. So long as Germany and Great Britain stand over against one another, as they now do, concentration in the North Sea is militarily right, and imposed; but, while the conditions render this necessary, they cannot be represented in force elsewhere, until the one or the other has a surplusage of ships, permitting big detachments.

How far groupings of the Powers, by alliance or *entente*, may modify this condition, may release some part of the aggregate European naval force to represent in other fields Europe's real power, is a very difficult question. It is supposable, for instance, that while Great Britain and Germany dispute the North Sea, France might assure to the *Entente* the control of the Mediterranean, to the no great sorrow of Italy. It has been said that the existing

agreements between France, Great Britain, and Spain, constitute a kind of Monroe Doctrine for the Western Mediterranean. Such a doctrine may grow, as the Monroe Doctrine has; may undertake, for example, to decide whether in the Mediterranean coast line there shall be any change which will affect conditions of naval power. A fleet competent to dictate in the Mediterranean, while the greatest navies stand on guard in the North Sea, would be substantially a flying squadron; occupying a great central position, available for momentary action elsewhere for a measurable time. Such combinations of navies have many historical precedents. They labor under the weakness always incident to coalitions, to the combined action of two or more nations; but they are not impossible.

The entertainment of such considerations is necessarily speculative and conjectural; but in the competition of nations

they constitute food for reflection to statesmen. Meantime, it is evident that, while conditions remain as they are, Japan and the United States, the only two outlying great naval nations, are, each in her special sphere of interests, less affected, directly, than if there were as of old an unchallenged naval supremacy in Europe. When Japan first entered into alliance with Great Britain, in 1902, the latter had such supremacy. She could then have spared substantial assistance in the Far East, if needed, and yet have maintained her superiority elsewhere. The Two Power Standard was then attained. Japan had already, in 1895, experienced European intervention to her injury, by a combination which Great Britain might have resisted; though with doubtful issue in the then lack of a Japanese battleship force. At the later date she did exercise such intervention, and it was decisive for Japan's next war. It

may well be questioned whether such interventions can be possible again, while the present competition of navies continues.

The two instances illustrate moreover the potent moral, as well as material, effect of a decided step, when taken. It is like offensive action confronting an unready enemy. In 1895, France, Germany, and Russia compelled Japan to retrocede the Liao-tung peninsula with Port Arthur. Great Britain was averse to this action, which was followed by the leasing of the retroceded positions by China to Russia; but she was unready, her mind not made up, the thing was done, and Japan had no battleship force. In 1904, the Anglo-Japanese alliance was an existent known fact, a positive measure; and Japan had a battle fleet. Great Britain was still the supreme naval power, and neither Germany nor France moved to support Russia. It was not indeed the policy of Germany

so to do; but it was that of France, were she able. In the case, and as things turned out, Japan fought her fight in her own North Sea, and Great Britain saw to the European end of the line. The circumstance illustrates division of labor between national fleets; for, although the British fleet had no fighting to do, its action was distinctly military — that of a "containing" force. It was equally a containing force in 1898, if the statement, already quoted, be true, viz.: that Great Britain, to the proposal of intervention between the United States and Spain, replied that she not only would not assist, but would resist.

These are illustrations also of the fact that the possession and exertion of organized force do not necessarily mean war. Such force may exert, and often does exert, its full proportional effect without striking a blow; and the more indisputably

effective it is, the surer and more peaceful the result. It may be righteously used, or it may not be; but the organization and possession of it do not necessarily mean even an inclination to war, nor does its absence constitute a guarantee of peace. The War of Secession in the United States is an instance in point. No belligerents in modern times have been more utterly unprepared for war, in any ordinary sense of preparation, than were the two parties to that conflict. Yet they fought, the most prolonged war since Waterloo; prolonged just because the absence of preparation on either side constituted for the moment an equality, which, however destined ultimately to disappear before the greater resources of the North, permitted the South — justly from a military point of view — to hope that she could achieve separation through the failure of perseverance, of staying power, in her adversary.

Naval support of Great Britain by a continental European Power, as suggested a few lines before, labors under the drawback that, if exerted, it is an act of war, and entails a land war as well; to which against Germany no single continental nation is at present equal. This is not to say that the French army is not a matter of very serious consideration, especially when taken in connection with the frontier defenses elaborated by France since 1870. Together, these offensive and defensive measures constitute just that security which organized force gives, even when ultimately inferior. It not only imposes respectful consideration beforehand, disinclining the adversary to a rupture for less than imperative reasons; it also, in case of hostilities, obtains delay, allowing time for skill, or for the chapter of accidents, to reverse conditions.

It is held by French writers that the

attitude of Germany in 1905 compelled the dismissal by the French Government of its foreign minister; and that the humiliation, with all the modification of policy it implied, was due to the fact that French military preparations had been permitted to fall into neglect, owing to causes not necessary here to name. On the contrary, a year later, demands similarly overbearing, in French estimation, were withstood, because the first lesson had led to preparations too obvious to be disregarded, except for causes more serious than existed. France then held her ground, and Germany, so it is said, lowered her tone. It is impossible to affirm absolutely concerning nearly contemporary transactions, the records of which are still covered by the secrecy of archives; but the general impression in Europe is that matters were as stated, and certainly there is the belief that such peremptoriness does

and will characterize the diplomacy of Germany, so long as her present military preponderance lasts. By this, as well as by other political necessities, Austria is chained to her; and the alliance on land is for the time irresistible. As in the alliance of Great Britain with Japan, it is not necessary that Austria act; it is enough to know that she must act, if need require.

This consideration of exposure on the land side vitiates the power of the *Entente*, except so far as counting the cost of a war will act as a deterrent to Germany, and so modify her political action, as in the case just cited. So much attainment is valuable; but it falls very far short of the power to take up an aggressive naval action by a continental state, thereby bringing on land war as well. It is one thing to be strong enough to make an adversary wary of attacking; it is quite

another to be able to beat him if a contest arises. The consideration disposes of the supposition that any European naval state would support the British position in the Mediterranean, unless already at war, or with war unavoidable. Otherwise, Great Britain alone must find the ships; and should Austria prove financially able to put afloat there the heavy squadron she has contemplated, it will have to be accepted as an addition to the British burden.

These conclusions, if reasonable, not only emphasize the paramount importance in world politics of the British navy, but they show also that there are only two naval states which can afford to help Great Britain with naval force, because they alone have no land frontiers which march with those of Germany. These states are Japan and the United States. In looking to the future, it becomes for them a question whether it will be to their

interest, whether they can afford, to exchange the naval supremacy of Great Britain for that of Germany; for this alternative may arise. Those two states and Germany cannot, as matters now stand, touch one another, except on the open sea; whereas the character of the British Empire is such that it has everywhere sea frontiers, is everywhere assailable where local naval superiority does not exist, as for instance in Australia, and other Eastern possessions. The United States has upon Great Britain the further check of Canada, open to land attack.

A German navy, supreme by the fall of Great Britain, with a supreme German army able to spare readily a large expeditionary force for over-sea operations, is one of the possibilities of the future. Great Britain for long periods, in the Seven Years War and Napoleonic struggle, 1756–1815, has been able to do, and has done, just this;

not because she has had a supreme army, but because, thanks to her insular situation, her naval supremacy covered effectually both the home positions and the expedition. The future ability of Germany thus to act is emphasized to the point of probability by the budgetary difficulties of Great Britain, by the general disorganization of Russia, and by the arrest of population in France. Though vastly the richer nation, the people of Great Britain, for the very reason of greater wealth long enjoyed, are not habituated to the economical endurance of the German; nor can the habits of individual liberty in England or America accept, unless under duress, the heavy yoke of organization, of regulation of individual action, which constitutes the power of Germany among modern states.

The rivalry between Germany and Great Britain to-day is the danger point, not only of European politics, but of world politics

as well. It is not that other delicate questions do not exist continuously, and still others arise from time to time. These indeed are the occasions, the kindling wood, from which great fires often start; but for a fire there must be material. Behind this particular rivalry are popular interests and jealousies, dependent upon industry and commerce, in which the welfare and livelihood of the peoples are involved. No such emphasized industrial and maritime competition between two communities has arisen since the time of Cromwell and the later Stewart kings, when England wrested from Holland her long possessed commercial supremacy, supported by a navy until then unconquered. Although the contemporary facts of to-day are matter of common knowledge, easily accessible, few outsiders clearly realize the degree of Germany's advance, or the conditions which invest it with peculiar significance; past

and future, as well as present. Nor do many so regard the remoter past as to comprehend, and enter into, the intensity of German feeling which accompanies her career of industrial and commercial achievement.

It is possible to sympathize with this feeling without ignoring that the menace of the progress is sensibly felt in world politics. To this has been due the gradual formation of the *Entente*, Great Britain with France and Russia, two nations traditionally antagonistic to her until very lately. This, with similar understandings, a German Chancellor denounced as an attempt to encircle Germany, — to isolate her; the motive for them being probably found in the necessities of the balance of power, not only in Europe, but over the world, constituting a reply to Germany's apparent disposition to push in many directions for maritime and commercial posi-

tions. It cannot be too often repeated that such ambitions give no just cause of offense; but it is quite a different thing to say that they call for no watchfulness, nor for counteraction. History has shown that in all such advance there is an inevitable element of aggressiveness, which can be kept within bounds only by an opposition of force. Thus is insured a balance, an equilibrium, the maintenance of which has been, and continues to be, the anxious preoccupation of European statesmen.

Since the War of Secession, the United States has been entering more and more, insensibly yet inevitably, into the European family, so that events there should preoccupy her citizens also. In the War with Spain, the Monroe pronouncement itself received European support as well as aroused European antagonism; and general report identified Germany with the latter, an impression doubtless strengthened by the

unpleasantness in the Philippines. Unquestionably, had Germany possessed then the navy which her programme now calls for, her attitude would have been stiffer and her position stronger. Our supporter at that time would have confronted a very different situation. The Spanish contention is settled, a thing of the past; but to the most superficial observer it must be obvious that the future bristles with questions in which we, in common with the entire European group of nations, have interests specific as well as general.

Let Germany's present, however, be considered in the light of her past; for, unless this be done with some approach to adequacy, it is impossible duly to allow for her as a contemporary factor. To understand in the best sense, it is necessary not only to recognize the interests of a nation, but to enter as well into its feelings; tracing them where possible to the historic origin which

once occasioned, and may still account for them. Such understanding is essential to just appreciation. The sentiment of a people is the most energetic element in national action. Even when material interests are the original exciting cause, it is the sentiment to which they give rise, the moral tone which emotion takes, that constitutes the greater force. Whatever individual rulers may do, masses of men are aroused to effective action — other than spasmodic — only by the sense of wrong done, or of right to be vindicated. For this reason governments are careful to obtain for their contentions an aspect of right which will keep their people at their backs.

The past of Germany has developed for her just such a sentiment, with which present interests coöperate to constitute a motive force of very great power; bringing the people of the Empire heartily in support of the general international attitude

of their rulers. As in all countries, there are within her borders internal contentions and conflicting interests, which divide men into parties, the effects of which color their view of particular international disputes as these arise; but underlying all there is the sense of what political unity has meant and has done for the German race. A recent French writer, in the *Revue des Deux Mondes*, discussing German diplomacy in a critical spirit, nevertheless says well, "The spirit of faction exists in Germany as elsewhere. But, to hold it in check, the sense of nationality is stronger there than elsewhere, and the patriotic cohesion, which at the call of the government unites that people of sixty millions, remains the profound truth which France more than any other country should beware of forgetting." The lesson may be for France in particular, but it likewise is for the world in general.

There is also wide spread in the German

people the recognition that the maintenance of this gain depends largely upon the sea. German union gave the needed impetus to German industrial enterprise, which dates since 1870; and industry has called for markets, for commerce, and for shipping. It begot also Protection, which draws its strongest line at the sea frontier. Protection was adopted in 1879, partly to foster home industries, commonly so called; partly to sustain agriculture, with its gift of food, against the drain of rural population to the factories. To this development of the industrial system, multiplying employment, has been due the decrease of emigration, from 220,000 in 1881, to 20,000 at present; a number more than made good by immigration, so that a recent German writer claims that Germany has become an immigrant nation.

The military correlative of all this is a navy. The numerical strength of the Ger-

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man Navy League, which drew its impulse from a similar association in Great Britain, now exceeds greatly that of the island state which beyond all others depends upon control of the sea; not for prosperity only, but for bare existence. This remarkable growth very probably is due in large measure to the singular capacity for systematic development of energy, for sagacious planning, adapting means to ends, which in Germany characterizes all movement, — military, educational, industrial, commercial; but, however excellent the propaganda of the League, it would not have accomplished its results had there not been in the popular sentiment something which corresponded to the appeal. Granting the sentiment, unquestionably the League has done much to give it form and vigor, and so to make it productive, in face of the great expenditure — that is, of the increase of debt and of the great additional taxation — involved; but

the sentiment was a condition necessary to success. "It is not our rules that have made our success," said recently the head of the League; "rather has the spirit that lives in the League. The spirit upon which we are founded is that of a German idealism. In our flag is incorporated the idealism of the German navy."

German naval expenditure has risen from less than ten million dollars in 1875, five years after the war with France, to over a hundred annual millions; and it is planned that the same rate shall continue for ten years to come. It will be remembered, too, that such a sum brings a larger return there than in the United States. This is no freak of a government, however little parliamentary to our notions that of Germany is. It is the expression of the will of a people. Also, it may be added, it is an additional illustration of the fact that a navy, and shipping generally, appeal to a national

sense of unity more powerfully than does any other one form of national activity; for the reason that, being external to the national bounds, they are less sectional and more universal in the impression produced. It is significant that, of the million and more members of the German League, one fourth are found in the single inland kingdom of Saxony. A great fleet, whether merchant or military, is a more conspicuous emblem of national power than are the other processes or results of national industrial achievement.

This is especially applicable to Germany, where the navy is a very new institution, and where the realization of unity, its conversion from a worshipped ideal to a concrete reality, is also new. As regards union, Germany to-day is very much where the United States was between 1789 and 1812. Union, embraced in a moment of racial exaltation, as it was by the American colonies

during the War of Independence, has been expressed and consecrated in Germany in a formal Constitution, the endurance of which throughout the lifetime of a generation has gained for it the grip which continuance always gives. But there remain, not yet outgrown, those "particularist" sentiments, to borrow the German phrase corresponding to our "states' rights," together with that divergence of local or sectional interests, which reproduce the conditions of the United States during the corresponding period of national existence; an inheritance from the jealousies of separate colonies. It required the War of 1812, and the consequent concentration of thought upon a single and common external motive, to develop a national sentiment, the devotion to an ideal, — of Union, — as distinguished from the motive of material interest, which had occasioned the framing of the Constitution and facilitated its adop-

tion. How powerful that sentiment was, voiced in the simple words "The Union," can be testified by those who remember the stormy days which preceded the War of Secession. No hatred of slavery, nor impulse of interest, competed in power with the idea of national integrity to be asserted and preserved.

So in the German confederacy, a customs union, prompted by evident advantage, had preceded political union and led to it; but the consummation of that achievement into a true national oneness requires a motive force transcending that of material interests. It is found in the pride of international position achieved by a united Germany, contrasted with the weakness of centuries of disunion, and with the humiliation of foreign intervention and oppression which that disunion had permitted. It seeks and finds expression in a national self-assertion, the occasions of which some-

times to an onlooker suggest — if Germans will pardon the remark — the sensitiveness of a newcomer, of one too recently in the position of attainment to take for granted the due recognition of the fact by others. Americans must be aware that there was a time when a like trait was noted in us; and it proceeded from the same cause, an uneasy impression that others were disposed to take us at less than our own valuation, and consequently to show us less than due consideration.

In both cases, also, it is true that in the policies of each state there was that which appeared to others self-assertion carried to the pitch of aggressiveness. "We will not permit equality with other Powers to be taken from us," said the late Chancellor, Bülow, some years ago. "We will not allow the right to speak like them in the world to be contested. We have become a great Power, and with God's help we hope

so to remain." The Monroe Doctrine, the symbol of American external policy, in its beginnings was as little liked as now is the purpose of external action of which the contemporary great German naval expansion is the visible token. That which by the state supporting each was characterized as defensive only, has appeared to other nations clearly aggressive in tendency. To forbid European possession upon these continents seems to an American simple reasonable precaution, for self-protection; but to others such prohibition may very well appear to pass beyond the bounds of defense into those of "offense," in the political and military sense of the word. It certainly so seemed in the early history of the Doctrine, but nations now have grown accustomed to its assertions, are tolerant of them; and, it must be added there is in the United States a latent power which commands consideration.

That latent power, however, must receive organization if it is to be fully effective. The concrete expression of the resources of a nation is its wealth, but it is trite to say that a nation, like a man, may abuse its wealth; may waste it by neglect, or neutralize it by misapplication. The United States at present has two leading principles of external policy — the Monroe Doctrine and the Open Door in the Far East. As towards Europe, our Nearer East, the immemorial policy is one of non-interference; negative, not positive; yet the correlative of the Monroe Doctrine. But non-interference with European interrelations does not imply absence of concern in them, nor should it involve heedlessness of the fact that the shifting of the balance in Europe may affect our interests and our power throughout the world. This truth also has its momentary concrete expression in the rivalry between Germany and Great

Britain, in which the existing economical and naval disparity is decreasing, though it is still considerable.

The United States may have many different diplomatic discussions with the several European nations; but with the European system, as now represented in the balance of power between the Triple Alliance and the Triple *Entente*, our concern is only in the effect which changes in that unstable equilibrium may have upon our two external policies. In the present state of that equilibrium, for the passing moment, but not so surely for an indefinite future, the Monroe Doctrine is less obviously liable to adverse influence than is the Open Door; because every foot of American soil is now the possession of some sovereign state, whose rights as such are ascertained by international law and cannot readily be infringed. The Chinese Empire is of course equally a sovereign state; but the feebleness of its organ-

ization, resulting in misgovernment and lack of military strength, has not only permitted but provoked the frequent interference of other nations, with constant assaults upon its rights of sovereignty, despite the greatness of its undeveloped wealth, in population and resources. The result of this has been to obscure and actually to lessen the effective value of those rights. They are freely disregarded in spirit, if not in letter. So far as the *status* of China is concerned, conditions are maintained not by her own power sustaining her rights, but by the opposition of interests, in relation to her, of other states; those of Europe, the United States, and Japan. The position in so far is identical with that of the Turkish Empire up to the revolution of a year ago, the outcome of which in this respect remains to be seen; the immediate results, we know, were Bulgaria's declaration of independence, and the annexations by Aus-

tria-Hungary. The uncertainties of such situations arise from local instability of government. They are continuously pregnant of surprises, such as that of Bulgaria, Bosnia, and Herzegovina; of difficult questions like that of Crete now, where the natural aspirations of the population are crushed by the policy of the protecting Powers, induced by the stubbornness of Turkey, which has drawn her line of acquiescence at Bulgaria and the Austrian annexations; in other words, at the point where force compels her to accept. Such transactions breed in the international relations of states a sense of insecurity which is liable to become acute suddenly.

Further, the Open Door, like the Monroe Doctrine, is a declaration of national policy, not an assertion of international law; except so far as it may be consecrated by agreements between particular nations. In

so far, and for the period of agreement, it binds the nations concerned; but for maintenance beyond this it depends upon power. No nation not consenting is bound to it by established principles, but is at liberty to disregard it; except as constrained by force which it feels compelled to respect. The Open Door also, like other policies, notably the Monroe Doctrine, is the outcome of conditions which have at last reached a turning point, a crisis; a moment of birth following a period of conception. Both are proclamations to the effect that processes long unimpeded have reached a stage when policy demands that it be said: Thus far shalt thou go, and no farther. The Monroe Doctrine said this to European colonization in America, till then unchallenged. The Open Door says the like to the further extension, by political or military intervention, of external control over Eastern markets, broadly understood to

cover all financial and commercial opportunity; control by annexation, or by influence resting upon force; in short, by substantial possession, however disguised.

Possession by such means, followed inevitably by subordinating the native markets to the policy of foreigners, has gone on for three centuries; and is seen now in British India, in the extensive Dutch and French holdings in the Far East, in Korea, in Manchuria, in the Philippines. These parallel former European control in the American continents. To arrest this progress at the doors of the four hundred million consumers which inhabit the Chinese Empire is the proximate aim of the Open Door. To this the integrity of the Chinese Empire is a corollary. That integrity is the concern of the United States, or of any country asserting the Open Door, not as a matter of benevolence, but because it is essential to

free access to Chinese markets; limited only by the general policy of the Chinese themselves, dealing equally with all outsiders. Inasmuch as China is not able to maintain her rights of sovereignty in this matter, unless assisted, the principle of integrity for the Empire follows upon the declaration of equal rights in her markets. Just how far the maintenance of the Open Door may carry the interested nations to decisive action, in support of the integrity of the Chinese Empire, remains to be seen. Overt action, as distinct from latent power to act, will be necessary only in case some among the countries concerned obtain, by positions, by predominant force, by intrigue, or by the negligence of rivals, a preponderance, destroying that balance which the Open Door requires. Equilibrium will ensure quiet. Thus the Open Door, which in principle has received the adhesion of the Western community of nations, does not

stand isolated, as an unrelated doctrine, but is a positive and formulated attitude affecting, however unconsciously of its range, the general policy of contact beween the East and the West.

IV

THE OPEN DOOR

IV

THE OPEN DOOR

THIS newcomer by name into the policies of nations, the Open Door, this artificially sustained balance of commercial opportunity, or free competition, proposes to exclude, within the regions affected, the advantage which most peoples to-day secure for their own industries within the limits of their territorial control. It is to-day the most conspicuous feature in the general policy of the Pacific Ocean, into which it enters as a factor. Its aim is essentially commercial, for the age is above all commercial in spirit; but, in the interaction of those forces which determine the character and degree of progress, material strength, physical power, underlies the undisturbed peaceful developments of indus-

try and exchange. Finance supports war; but readiness for war shields from external molestation the processes upon which finance is sustained. It was this assurance of quiet under the wings of her navy that enabled the financial eminence of Great Britain to be built up. A like immunity has been conferred upon the United States by remoteness from the scenes of European contentions, and still more by the exigencies of the Balance of Power fettering the action of European states. The result in the two instances is that the two English speaking states are now the richest in the world. So the Open Door, to be beneficially effective, demands evident security of maintenance, freedom from disturbance, under the balance of forces applicable in the Pacific in general, and in the Western Pacific in particular.

It seems then of interest to consider the question of balance of power in the Pacific,

as bearing upon the question of the maintenance of the Open Door; the more so that the United States obviously, by her geographical situation as a Pacific Power, and by her advocacy of the Open Door, has a peculiar interest in the matter. She has also peculiar opportunity, advantage, for the application of such material organized power as she may see fit to develop for the maintenance of her contentions. In the matter of particular advanced positions in that ocean she stands on a level with European Powers; but their positions, while useful in a military and commercial sense, are very remote from the base of the national power, with a long line of communications, exposed in the case of each to molestation by possible enemies at many places. As before pointed out, there is now a tendency towards such an equilibrium of naval force in Europe as will render increasingly difficult for any one

Power to divert a large detachment of its navy so far from the home shores. In this is seen again the effect of European relations upon American interests.

It is not to the interest of the United States to propose to herself the object of supremacy in the Pacific; a regrettable phrase, too often used, provocative of antagonism by its very sound. An assured supremacy over her own possessions, and over the approaches to them, is in her case a legitimate aim, menacing none; for there is no country so situated, relatively to her, as to have access to its own ports endangered by her superior navy, which is the unfortunate relation of the British navy to Germany. The dilemma of Great Britain is that she cannot help commanding the approaches to Germany, by the mere possession of the very means essential to her own existence as a state of the first order. No such invidious character-

istic attaches to the position of the United States; but from her geographical situation, in virtue of nearness, whatever military numbers she may possess have increased effectiveness towards either the Panama Canal, when finished, or towards the Far East. This is true even now, before the completion of the canal; because, granting proper permanent preparations on the Pacific coast, the fleet can be assembled there, not as soon as desirable, but soon enough to retrieve injuries that may have been received on account of its absence. This assumes that the battle-ships will be kept together, concentrated in force, whether in the Atlantic or in the Pacific; the only proper disposition for them. Whatever its numbers, the fleet gains in proportionate force, when nearness to the scene not only facilitates action but reduces the necessity of detachments and of long lines of communication.

The recent development of the German navy, present and programmed, if the word may be allowed, has most singularly modified, in a favorable sense for the immediate present, the effective power of the United States in the Pacific. In an article on the Disposition of Navies, written eight years ago, shortly after the promulgation of the first treaty of conditional alliance between Great Britain and Japan, and two years before the war between Japan and Russia, I had occasion to comment upon the then existing difficulties, and the necessary provision to meet them, on the part of the confronting allies, Japan and Great Britain, France and Russia. The importance of the Mediterranean to the communications, and their exposure within it, were naturally prominent features in such a discussion. Russia then already had assembled in the Far East the fine squadron of which such pitiful use was

afterwards made. But while the possible attitude, or action, of Germany, in case of an Eastern war involving others than the immediate participants, was considered, it was not felt that her fleet then would powerfully affect the balance, as otherwise constituted. Great Britain then held achieved the Two Power Standard; and there seemed no cause for doubt that she could both control the communications and seriously help her ally, should it become necessary to do more than hold the French navy in check in the waters of Europe.

This was eight years ago. Now the German navy is developing a power which will soon make it second to that of Great Britain, with a large margin of superiority over every other one, including that of the United States. The result of this is to fasten the British navy to British waters. In occupying this situation, as Great

Britain now has done, an advanced front of operations is maintained in concentrated force, relying upon such disposition to protect all the region behind; that is, practically, all her colonies, and every essential sea communication of the British Islands with the outside world. As a military measure this is perfectly correct; and so long as it holds, so long as no disaster or neglect weakens the British fleet, it will be effective both for defense, and for the offensive work of cutting Germany's sea communications. But it is a disposition that must be sustained in peace as well as in war. No chance of a surprise, by dividing the battleships between home waters and others can be permitted; the fact of Austria in 1866, and of France in 1870, stand as warnings against surprise by superior force and superior preparation.

Obviously, while this European tension lasts, neither Germany nor Great Britain

can divert much force to the Pacific. In March, 1910, according to the reply made by the head of the Admiralty to a question in Parliament, there are on the China Station no British battleships, only four first-class cruisers; and also no such cruisers nor battleships in the British East Indies. The navies of the two states, and other circumstances of national strength, remain indeed factors for consideration elsewhere. They forbid, for instance, the adoption by another country of measures which might cause the two to unite even momentarily against it; but the Open Door, if adhered to as a policy, offers to commercial states no temptation to resistance. Attempts to obtain undue national privileges, especially if by force, or by an unfair use of present occupation, may make the Open Door a cause of war by inducing measures to resist its violation; but the maintenance of equal trade opportunity will not provoke

opposition. The same general conditions that find expression in the protagonism of Germany and Great Britain will control also the action of the smaller European navies; for each one of them is a factor in the balance of power, which is essential to the independent movement of all the states.

The result is to leave the two chief Pacific nations, the United States and Japan, whose are the only two great navies that have coastlines on that ocean, to represent there the balance of power. This is the best security for international peace; because it represents, not a bargain, but a fact, readily ascertainable. Those two navies are more easily able than any other to maintain there a concentration of force; and it may even be questioned whether sound military policy may not make the Pacific rather than the Atlantic the station for the United States

battle fleet. For the balance of naval power in Europe, which compels the retention of the British and German fleets in the North Sea, protects the Atlantic coast of the United States, — and the Monroe Doctrine, — to a degree to which nothing in Pacific conditions corresponds. Under existing circumstances, neither Germany nor Great Britain can afford, even did they desire, to infringe the external policy of the United States represented in the Monroe Doctrine.

With Japan in the Pacific, and in her attitude towards the Open Door, the case is very different from that of European or American Powers. Her nearness to China, Manchuria, Korea, gives the natural commercial advantages that short and rapid transportation always confers. Labor with her is still cheap, another advantage in open competition; but the very fact of these near natural markets, and her in-

terest in them, cannot but breed that sense of proprietorship which, in dealing with ill-organized states, easily glides into the attempt at political control that ultimately means control by force. Hence the frequent reports, true or untrue, that such advantage is sought and accomplished. Whether true or not, these illustrate what nations continually seek, when opportunity offers or can be made. This is in strict line with that which we call Protection; but with the difference that Protection is exercised within the sphere commonly recognized as legitimate, either by International Law or by the policy of competing states. The mingled weakness and perverseness of Chinese negotiators invite such attempt, and endanger the Open Door; give rise to continual suspicion that undue influence resting upon force is affecting equality of treatment, or is establishing a basis for inequality in the future.

There can be no question that the general recent attitude of Russia and Japan, however laudably meant, does arouse such suspicions.[1]

Then again, the American possession, the Hawaiian Islands, are predominantly Japanese in labor population; a condition which, as the outcome of little more than a generation, warrants the jealousy of Japanese immigration on the part of the Pacific coast. Finally, the population of that coast is relatively scanty, and its communications with the East, though rapid for express trains, are slow for the immense traffic of men and stores which war implies and requires. That is, the power of the country east of the Rocky Mountains

[1] See a very significant editorial, "The Question of Manchuria," in the *London Times* of August 6, 1910. The *Times* has been throughout a consistent and strong advocate of the Anglo-Japanese alliance.

See also "The Mystery of the Status Quo" in the *Nineteenth Century* for September.

has far to go, and with poor conveyance, in order to reinforce the Western Coast; the exact opposite of our advantage of rapid maritime access to the Panama Canal. In the absence of the fleet, invasion may be easy. Harm may be retrieved in measure by the arrival of the fleet later; but under present world conditions the Pacific coast seems incomparably the more exposed of the three great divisions of the American shore line — the Atlantic, the Gulf, and the Pacific.

Such a conclusion traverses the practice of the nation since it became a nation; but the navies of Germany and of Japan are newcomers, not a generation of mankind old. The international effect of each, as viewed by the writer, has been indicated; that of Japan briefly, that of Germany much more at large because the European system is excessively complicated, one of checks and balances, the growth and de-

velopment of centuries. It is not indeed very difficult to understand in main outlines, but it involves and is conditioned by a multiplicity of details, requiring much minute information and much historical knowledge of antecedents, without which appreciation and a reasonably accurate estimate of probabilities are impossible.

Such knowledge and appreciation are the growth of a lifetime; the business of an expert, a specialist; confined probably to a very few men in Europe, and for which perhaps no American has exhaustive need. But while the helm of state must be committed to experts, as that of an army to generals, national movement, like that of an army, is compact and powerful in proportion as those who follow comprehend and share, in their subordinate measure, the plans and spirit of the leader, and thus are prepared to give support which, to be really dependable,

must be intelligent. Comprehension of the great issues to which, in our day beyond any previous, the whole world is a party, needs to be spread among our people, because as never before these matters concern us as members of a great family. Thus national policy will become the policy, not of the government only, but of the people; giving a momentum of unanimity without which no national movement can be effective, least of all in external policy beyond its own borders.

During the year 1910 the occurrence which has modified most noticeably the inter-relations of states has been the Russo-Japanese Convention of July 4. The full scope of this is not yet clearly understood, but evidently there is contemplated not only an accord between the two Powers as regards their mutual relations at their very delicate point of contact in the Far

East, but further also mutual support against the intrusion of a policy foreign to both. In such possible opposition are included, not merely European or American states, but likewise the wishes of China, whose proper national territory is the subject of the Convention.

The date of this Convention follows quickly — as diplomatic movements count quickness — upon the proposal of the United States to insure the neutralization of the railroads in Chinese territory, now under the control of Japan and Russia, as well as of others contemplated in Manchuria. Therefore, although public assurance has been made that the substance of the Convention was determined before the American proposition was communicated, the framing of the agreement may seem to indicate a direct purpose of coöperation to resist any possible interference having similar ends in view. Such intervention,

however, is not at all likely to take place, except in the shape of diplomatic representation, unless hindrance to the free working of the Open Door should seem likely to result. Such hindrance would affect similarly all maritime nations, whose combined navies still hold in their hands the ultimate effectual control of such a situation, as actually as they did ten years ago. Otherwise, the prescriptions of the Open Door being observed, conditions in Europe are too delicate to permit interference; and Germany at least will not fall into the mistake made by Great Britain of undertaking any measure liable to relieve, or to withdraw, Russia from entanglements in the Far East, for this would by so far add to her power to bring pressure to bear upon Germany in Europe.

This aspect of the recent Convention, indeed, has been jealously noted at once.

It may contribute eventually to retard the progress of the German navy, which hitherto has been directly facilitated by the weakening of Russia through her disastrous war with Japan, and by the internal troubles ensuant. The success of Japan owed much to the treaty of alliance with Great Britain, which effectually deterred France from such coöperation with her ally Russia as she had extended in 1895. Great Britain thus contributed, scarcely indirectly, to that removal of Russian incidence upon Germany which has facilitated financially the upbuilding of the German navy, but which may be counteracted in part by the recent agreements between Japan and Russia.

The argument against the Anglo-Japanese alliance, as a measure of policy on the part of Great Britain, suggested before the war between Japan and Russia, was that the more heavily Russia became engaged in

the Far East, in her endeavor to reach an ice-free sea, the less could she bear upon British interests in the Levant and in the Middle East; notably in Persia and Afghanistan. There is a limit, usually financial, to national aggressiveness. In the Far East Russia was then confronted by Japan; and not by Japan alone, but by every nation interested in that freedom of trade with China which has given origin to the expression, the Open Door. There could be no question that should Russia there attempt exclusion, or undue control, she would be face to face with all naval Powers, whose common interest in calling her to order would insure coöperation so far; and farther would not be certainly desirable. Meanwhile, Russia's preoccupations there would limit necessarily her action elsewhere; in the Balkans, in Persia, and on the German frontier. It is believed that German statesmanship encouraged

Russia to undertake national enterprise in the distant East, after the time when the policy of Bismarck sought alliance with Austria-Hungary preferably to that with the Czar. The joint intervention of 1895, to which Germany was a party, by depriving Japan of Port Arthur helped markedly to determine towards the Farther East Russia's main effort of expansion, until she was checked by Japan. As has been shown by recent occurrences, the profound humiliation and weakening of Russia contributes to enhance this limitation upon her influence in Europe; while at the same time the commercial and naval nations, Great Britain included, find themselves confronted in Manchuria with two particular national interests established in possession, instead of one.

The late conventions between Japan and Russia as to their position in Manchuria, and that between Great Britain and Rus-

sia as to their mutual relations and accordant action in Persia, are direct outcomes of the late war in the Far East, and are incidents in the general combination which half unconsciously has been forming among the European states, as the result of the German predominance. Of this the most threatening exponent has been the growth of the German navy. The various conventions have their one unifying motive in the relief of mutual pressure between the states contracting them, in order to increase their ability to balance the two mid-Europe military monarchies.

The general movement of which these are specific incidents encounters necessarily the difficulty which attends all artificial combinations. Conflict of aims is the gnawing defect of most alliances not founded upon immediate dominant interests, as that between Germany and Austria-Hungary has been estimated to be. So far

and so long as paper conventions can compose clashing interests, to the mutual relief of the parties concerned, so good; but the motive of the two conventions specified is not local, but remote. They have been contracted, not chiefly to reconcile immediate difficulties on the spot, which have not ceased to exist, and are merely postponed, but in order to affect distant contingencies. The contrary interests of Japan and Russia in the Far East are no less than they were, nor have they ceased to haunt the background of the national consciousness. Like a quarreling couple, they have for the moment joined hands against outsiders, but their own causes of variance remain, and will receive a solution of force; not necessarily of war. The timely exhibition of force may prevent open war; but it is scarcely for merely commercial reasons that the Russian Duma, in the face of notorious

money embarrassments, has been induced to authorize the double tracking and general improvement of the Siberian railroad, the imperfect construction of which so vitally affected the exertion of Russian strength, despite the eminent administrative supervision displayed during the war. Nor is the annexation of Korea, formally effected since these pages were written, calculated wholly to soothe Russian susceptibilities. It is perfectly understandable, all the same, that Russia for the moment may prefer to join hands with Japan in resisting tendencies which would complicate the situation by bringing upon the scene other Powers; and the case is much the same in Persia as regards Great Britain and Russia, as has been shown from time to time by slight straws impelled by puffs of wind.

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